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I. Introduction and Summary
Agencies continually interpret the statutes they administer. Their
interpretations are expressed in a great variety of forms-in legisla-
tive regulations, adjudicatory opinions, manuals, court briefs,
interpretive rules, policy statements, staff instructions, opinion letters,
audits, correspondence, informal advice, guidelines, press releases,
testimony before Congress, internal memoranda, speeches, ex-
planatory statements in the Federal Register, and others.
This Article examines the extent to which these varied forms of
agency interpretive expression, sometimes referred to as "formats,"
should be accepted or accorded some sort of consideration by the
courts that review them. This inquiry is part of a larger one, which
forms its context: Under what circumstances should it be the
agencies, rather than the courts, that place definitive interpretations
upon federal statutes? Put another way, when is a reviewing court
bound to accept the agency's interpretation?
Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, and "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is."' "[O]ne of the judiciary's characteristic roles is to
interpret statutes . . "2 But in reviewing interpretations placed
upon statutes by the agencies that administer them, the courts for
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
2. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Amer. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
Interpretive Formats and the Force of Law
many decades have accorded respectful attention or even controlling
effect to such agency interpretations.
In some situations, the court deems itself bound to accept the
agency's interpretation outright, thereby giving it controlling effect,
provided only that it is consistent with statute and is reasonable. In
other cases, the court reserves the power to arrive independently at
its own interpretation; the court should give respectful consideration
to the agency's construction, but may reject it, even if it seems a
reasonable one.'
The law governing judicial acceptance of agencies' interpretations
of the statutes they administer is now dominated by Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' The Supreme Court has
cited this case dozens of times, and the lower federal courts,
hundreds. Chevron is understood to require a reviewing court to
accept an agency interpretation that (a) is not contrary to statute or
specific statutory intent and (b) is reasonable. (I shall refer to this
judicial process as "Chevron acceptance" of the agency interpretation.)
This understanding unquestionably governs the usual case in
which the agency, in pursuance of delegated authority, issues its
interpretation through a legislative regulation or other agency action
possessing the force of law.6 But what if the same interpretation-
3. "[C]ourts do not necessarily abdicate a Marshallian duty to 'say what the law is' by
deferring to agencies. Courts retain the authority to control administrative abuses of power;
deferential review simply recasts the question of law as whether the agency's interpretation
is 'reasonable'." Diver, Statuto Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv.
549, 569 (1988), (citing Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 27-28 (1983)). See also Levin, Identifying Q@etions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1, 21 (1985).
4. Cases and commentary have confusingly used the term "deference" to refer to both
of these approaches, even though they imply different roles for the reviewing court.
Indeed, the courts often have been quite unclear about which approach they were
following. For precision, this Article refers to the first approach as "acceptance", or
sometimes in more specific contexts as "Chevron acceptance" or "Hearst acceptance." See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). I shall call the second approach
"special consideration," or more specifically "Skidmore consideration." See Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Under the analysis presented in this Article, there can
be a third approach. In cases of pre-enforcement review, where the court does not need
to make a final and complete interpretation, it may limit its review to the question of
whether the agency's interpretation is demonstrably wrong, without deciding whether it is
right or acceptable. See text accompanying infta notes 182-83.
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by five other members
of the Court. Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O'Connor did not participate.
6. An agency interpretation "has the force of law", and therefore is "binding" upon
the courts (as well as upon the public and upon the agency itself), when a court may not
review it freely, but must accept it unless it is contrary to statute or unreasonable. See infra
note 17 and accompanying text. A legislative regulation issued pursuant to delegated
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identical in its substantive content-were expressed only in an
opinion letter, a policy statement, a press release, or an amicus
brief?
Agencies rarely possess congressionally delegated authority to
make definitive interpretations, carrying the force of law, through
such informal issuances. Nevertheless a reviewing court-under a
broad and perhaps uncritical reading of Chevron-might feel
compelled to accept the interpretation, without regard for the
agency's lack of delegated authority to issue authoritative interpreta-
tions through informal formats like these. A number of courts have
done so.'
Such a reading of Chevron is possible because its language
suggests that, if the reviewing court cannot find specific congres-
sional intent on the precise point at issue, but rather finds the
statute to be silent or ambiguous on that point, it should presume
that Congress delegated to the agency the interpretive authority to
fill the gap, and must therefore accept any reasonable agency
interpretation.' It is then but a short step, perhaps unconsciously
taken, to assume that this implied delegation requires acceptance of
the interpretation without regard for the format in which it is
expressed.
Should the courts under Chevron be bound to accept (and not
merely to consider) reasonable agency interpretations expressed in
informal formats? The present study addresses this question, and
yields generally negative answers. Where the format is an informal
one, it ordinarily does not carry the force of law, and a reviewing
court is not bound by the agency interpretation, though it should
give special consideration to the agency opinion.
The threshold issue for the court is always one of congressional
intent: did Congress intend the agency's interpretation to bind the
courts? The touchstone in every case is whether Congress intended to
delegate to the agency the power to interpret with the force of law in the
particular format that was used.
Sometimes the reviewing court will conclude that Congress has
mandated or prohibited a specific substantive position. In such a
case, obviously, the court cannot find that Congress intended a
delegation to the agency to interpret inconsistently, and an agency
statutory authority is an example of agency action possessing these characteristics. See
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977), quoted at note 17 infra. See also Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 187-96.
8. Chevron. 467 U.S. at 843-44. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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interpretation may enjoy the force of law if (and only if) it conforms
to the substantive congressional intent. In every other case, however,
an agency interpretation that claims the force of law must be
grounded in an adequate delegation.
When looking for delegation, the reviewing court must of course
first satisfy itself as to the agency's delegated authority to make
binding interpretations with respect to the subject matter. Under
Chevron, though, such a delegation may be presumed from the mere
existence of a "gap"-statutory silence or ambiguity on the point at
issue. Second, and more important for present purposes, the court
must also identify a delegation of power to make binding interpreta-
tions through the particular format chosen by the agency: Did
Congress authorize the agency to make law through this format?
Any difficulty in answering this question cannot justify a failure
to ask it. That Congress's delegatory intent must sometimes be
sought through inference and construction, rather than from direct
manifestations of congressional will, does not diminish the indispen-
sability of this inquiry. Under our system of limited government, an
agency cannot announce actions that bind citizens and the courts
unless Congress has delegated to it the authority to do so.
The needed delegation is unlikely to be found for agency
interpretations expressed through informal formats.9 But, unless the
courts insist upon a delegation as to format as a condition of
Chevron acceptance, interpretations set forth in informal formats
would command as much force as do legislative regulations, and
agencies could freely avoid the public procedures and safeguards
required for issuance of such regulations. Worse, the courts would
accord binding force to actions that Congress had not authorized to
have binding force.
Part II of this Article reviews pre-Chevron law concerning judicial
consideration of agency interpretations. Part III analyzes the Chevron
doctrine and the experience under it, with emphasis on the role of
the delegation inquiry. Part IV brings a close focus upon the
assortment of formats in which agency interpretations are set forth.
It demonstrates how the delegated authority for the use of each
9. In the rare case, an informal interpretive format may be entitled to judicial
acceptance because Congress intended that such informal interpretive expressions be
authoritative and bind the courts if not irrational. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mulhollin,
444 U.S. 555, 566-68 (1980). But this apparent exception simply proves the rule, since a
congressional delegation had invested the informally expressed agency interpretation with
the force of law. See infra notes 153-72 and accompanying text.
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format should determine whether the reviewing court must accept
the agency interpretation or need only give it special consideration.
II. Prior Patterns of Acceptance and Deference
No pre-Chevron case articulated a consistent or comprehensive
statement of doctrine, like that ventured in Chevron, on the appro-
priate measure of judicial deference to agencies. Judicial attitudes
reflected in the opinions range from a near-abject acceptance,"0 to a
skeptical consideration of agency views," to an ignoring of them
altogether.'
Sometimes the judicial language sweepingly called for acceptance,
but at the same time identified the specific circumstances inducing
acceptance, leaving doubt about the rule of acceptance where such
circumstances were not present." At other times, the opinions spoke
not of outright acceptance but of degrees of "deference" or "weight"
to be granted the agency interpretations.' 4 In these instances the
"decision whether to grant deference depend[ed] on various
attributes of the agency's legal authority and functions and of the
administrative interpretation at issue."'5 But the pre-Chevron cases
were habitually unclear in indicating the point at which the weight
or deference due would compel a court to accept the agency
interpretation. 6
10. E.g., Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1904), quoted in United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961).
11. E.g., Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946).
12. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1947).
13. "[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially where Congress
has refused to alter the administrative construction." Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (upholding legislative regulation). A striking post-Chevron example
of such a juxtaposition is found in NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
484 U.S. 112, 120 n.20 (1987) and accompanying text.
14. E.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8
(1983) ("[A]n agency acting within its authority to make policy choices consistent with the
congressional mandate should receive considerable deference from courts .... "); Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969) ("While this court has announced that it will accord great
weight to a departmental construction of its own enabling legislation, ... it is only one
input in the interpretational equation").
15. Diver, supra note 3, at 562. See also infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
16. Even in an opinion that went to some pains to elucidate the issues of "deference,"
for example, the Court made this typical statement: "The interpretation put on the statute
by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference, but the courts are the
final authorities on issues of statutory construction." FEC v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981) (,_ ation omitted). But see, e.g., Fulman v.
United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978) (conteil)oraneous Treasury Regulations must be
sustained unless unreasonable or plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes).
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Although no analysis can harmonize all of the pre-Chevron cases,
some rather dear patterns are evident. These emerge when one
focuses upon the formats in which the agency interpretations were
expressed. Where agencies exercised delegated power to pronounce
interpretations in formats bearing the force of law, reviewing courts
accepted those interpretations, provided they were reasonable and
consistent with statute. In other formats, the courts accorded special
consideration to the agency interpretations, but approved them only
if persuaded that they were correct.
A. Legislative Regulations
Courts have generally accepted agency interpretations set forth in
legislative regulations issued pursuant to delegated authority to
promulgate rules with the force of law. For example:
Congress in § 407(a) expressly delegated to the Secretary [of
Health, Education and Welfare] the power to prescribe
standards for determining what constitutes "unemployment" for
purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind,
Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts,
the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term.
In exercising that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regula-
tions with legislative effect. A reviewing court is not free to set
aside these regulations simply because it would have inter-
preted the statute in a different manner...
The regulation at issue in this case is therefore entitled to
more than mere deference or weight. It can be set aside only
if the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority or if the
regulation is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 7
Congress explicitly delegated to the Secretary broad authority
to promulgate regulations defining eligibility requirements for
Medicaid. We find that the regulations at issue in this case are
consistent with the statutory scheme and also are reasonable
exercises of the delegated power. The Court of Appeals
therefore was not justified in invalidating them, and we
reverse. 8
17. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977) (emphasis in original).
18. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981).
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Even where the statutes conferred only a general rulemaking power,
rather than a specific delegation as in the quoted cases, and even
where the courts did not speak expressly of delegation, the legisla-
tive regulations were accepted and upheld. 9 When such regulations
were struck down, it was typically because they went beyond
statutory authority, rather than because they were found to be
unreasonable."
B. Interpretations Expressed in Adjudicatory Decisions
1. Adjudication of Mixed Questions
The courts also have regularly accepted agency interpretations
pronounced in adjudications applying statutes to specific facts.2' In
such a determination, where the statutory law is closely mixed with
detailed facts, the agency's action may be more accurately viewed as
an application of the statute, rather than as an interpretation in any
abstract or general sense.22 In the well-known Hearst case,2 3 the issue
was whether certain newsboys who sold newspapers on street
corners, for their own account but under some control by the
publishers, were in the specific circumstances "employees" within the
National Labor Relations Act. The agency held that they were, and
the Court accepted the agency view. It stated that the detailed
determination of who was an "employee" was a task that had been
assigned to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,
and that resolving that question "belongs to the usual administrative
routine" of the National Labor Relations Board."' The Court held
19. E.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973);
Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
20. E.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944). See also
Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
21. E.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); United States v.
Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 314 (1914). See also Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60,
75, 87 (1975).
22. Professor Schotland contrasts "law-declaring, which has to do with general
construction of a statute wholly independently of the controversy at bar" and "law-applying,
or applying a statute or other item of law to the particular facts at bar, . . . [which is]
part of the normal particularized administration of the statute and its resolution belongs
mainly to the body with the first-line responsibility for that administration." Schotland,
Scope of Remew of Administmtive Action, 34 FED. B.J. 54, 58 (1975).
23. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
24. Id. at 130 (quoting Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941)).
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that "the Board's determination that specified persons are 'employ-
ees' under this Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record'
and a reasonable basis in law." 5
In these "mixed question" cases, where an agency in adjudication
applies statutes to detailed and specific facts, the court accepts the
agency determination, even though it implicates a legal question of
interpreting the statute and even though the court might indepen-
dently have reached a different result."6 The agency determination
must be accepted because Congress intended that the agency rather
than the courts be vested with the authoritative responsibility to
make such detailed and specific interpretations through adjudicatory
decisions, and Congress thereby intended that judicial review be
limited, not independent.27 In other words, Congress expressly or
impliedly delegated to the agency the primary power so to interpret,
subject only to limited judicial review.2"
2. Adjudication of Pure Questions and Major Interpretive Questions
Not every type of interpretation generated in an agency adjudica-
tion has won judicial acceptance. Those involving pure rather than
mixed questions, or major rather than minor issues, have usually
been subjected to independent review by the courts. We may
regard an interpretive question as a "pure" one if its resolution does
not depend upon the specific facts of the agency adjudication.' The
courts appear to have presumed that such questions were within
their own traditional judicial competencies and that Congress had
25. Id. at 131. The "reasonable basis in law" element of this test can fairly be
equated with the generalized formulation, mentioned throughout this paper, that an
interpretation, to be judicially accepted, must be reasonable and not contrary to statute.
26. I shall refer to this phenomenon as "Hearst acceptance" of the agency interpreta-
tion.
27. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495-97 (1979); INS v. Wang, 450
U.S. 139, 144-45 (1981). See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
549 (1965) ("a law-applying judgment is presumptively within the area of the agency's
discretion") (emphasis in original).
28. "Where, as here, a determination [as to whether in the specific circumstances a
railroad was the 'produccer' of coal it consumed] has been left to an administrative body,
this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion left untouched." Gray
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941).
29. See supra note 22. Obviously, there can be uncertainties along the borderline
between "pure" and "mixed" questions, but a precise delineation is unnecessary for the
present analysis.
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not delegated primary interpretive authority over to the agencies. 0
Thus, where the issue under the labor statute was generically
whether retirees could be "employees,"' or managers could be
"employees, " 2 or foremen could be "employees,"" the Supreme
Court considered these as pure questions and arrived independently
at its own constructions.? Such pure interpretive determinations, in
other words, are not assigned to the agency's "usual administrative
routine"5 so as to be entitled to judicial acceptance.
Such pure questions typically are also major questions. The
constructions that resolve them often shape the major anatomy of
the statutes involved. Deciding whether particular newsboys in a
specific setting were covered by the labor law could play only a
relatively small role in the administration of the statute. The
resolution of issues concerning the coverage of large generic classes
like retirees or managers was fundamental.6 The Hearst case itself
illustrates a distinction between major and minor issues. Before
addressing the situation of the newsboys, the Court independently
resolved a bedrock interpretive question, holding that the term
"employee" should not be construed by simple references to state or
common law.
37
30. When an agency's decision is premised on its understanding of a
specific congressional intent, however, it engages in the quintessential
judicial function of deciding what a statute means. In that case, the
agency's interpretation, particularly to the extent it rests on factual
premises within its expertise, may be influential, but it cannot bind
a court.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 98 n. 8 (1983).
31. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 165-
71 (1971).
32. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
33. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488-90 (1947).
34. In AUied Cheasical and Bell Aerospace, the Court overturned the Labor Board's
decision. In Packard, the Court upheld the Board, but clearly did so by using its own
generic interpretation to decide "the naked question of law," Packard, 330 U.S. at 493,
earlier stated as "whether foremen are entitled as a class to the rights . . . assured to
employees generally by the National Labor Relations Act." Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
35. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (quoting Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941)).
36. "Packard . .. presented a legal question of great importance in the field of labor
relations: 'Does the NLRA cover shop foremen?' This question raised political, as well as
policy, concerns; it seems unlikely that Congress wished to leave so important and delicate
a legal question to the Board to decide." Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. Rxv. 363, 371 (1986).
37. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-24 (1944). See Note, The
Chevron Legacy: Young v. Community Nutrition Institute Compounds the Confusion, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 113, 116-18 (1987).
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Of course an interpretive question can be a pure one without also
being a major one. The agency in Social Security Board v. Nirotko8
had held in an adjudication that an NLRB back pay award did not
constitute "wages" creditable to the claimant's Social Security account.
The question was a pure one, having no dependence on the specific
facts of the case. The Court declined to accept the agency's decision
as "conclusive" and proceeded to interpret the statute independently,
pointing out that Congress had not delegated to the agency author-
ity to determine what compensation should be treated as wages."9
Nierotko appears to teach that courts will not readily find a delega-
tion to decide abstract questions through adjudication, despite the
modest importance of the issue. On the other hand, it should be
expected that minor questions, even if abstract, can sometimes be
grist for routine agency interpretation.
An issue may be a major one but not a pure one. The Highland
Park40 case presented the question whether the Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations (better known as the CIO) was a "national
or international labor organization" whose officers were required to
file noncommunist affidavits in order to use the machinery of the
NLRB. Entailing as it did the application of the statutory term to a
single specific labor organization, the question arguably was a mixed
one of law and fact. Yet the Court reversed the Board's adjudicative
determination and held through independent interpretation that the
CIO fell within the statutory ban.4' Although "the question [was]
one of specific application of a broad statutory term,"' the Court
did not treat it as belonging to "the usual administrative routine. '43
The issue of whether to apply the statute to the nation's largest
labor organization was apparently too momentous to permit an
Further examples of cases independently resolving interpretive questions that were both
pure ones and major ones are Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S.
441 (1947) and American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) ("The
deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which
results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly
made by Congress").
See text accompanying infra notes 69-89, 225-32 (discussing pure questionmis in context
of delegation analysis).
38. 327 U.S. 358 (1946).
39. Id. at 369.
40. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951).
41. The majority opinion entirely ignored the Board's reasoning. Justices Frankfurter
and Douglas dissented on the ground that the NLRB's determination was reasonable and
therefore should have been accepted. Id. at 326-28.
42. NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
43. Id. at 130.
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assumption that Congress had delegated the primary interpretive
power to the agency."
3. Summary
Overall, the Supreme Court marked out a discernible pattern in
the pre-Chevron cases involving agency adjudicative interpretations:
Where the agency adjudication purported to resolve a pure question
or a major question of interpretation, the reviewing court would
probably interpret independently,4 unless it dearly found that
Congress had delegated the primary decision of such questions to
the agency." Where the adjudication decided a mixed question of
applying broad statutory language to specific fact, the court would
accept the agency view, except perhaps where large consequences
carried the matter beyond the routine within which the agency was
assumed to possess a delegated power.
The pivotal question in these cases was whether Congress
intended the agency, in the particular circumstances, to have the
primary power to construe the statute through adjudication. Such a
delegatory intent is most naturally found where the issue is a mixed
one. The agency has the relatively modest duty of applying the
statute in the exercise of its administrative routine. Congress is much
less apt to want the agencies to control the courts' determination of
the grand questions or the pure ones.
C. Other Interpretative Formats
As shown, agency interpretations have been accepted where they
were expressed in legislative regulations or, often, in adjudicative
determinations. In other formats, where the agency action does not
carry the force of law, "administrative interpretations of statutory
terms [were] given important but not controlling significance" '47 by
44. "An implied delegation of a law-declaring function is especially likely where, as
here, the question is interstitial, involves the everyday administration of the statute,
implicates no special judicial expertise, and is unlikely to affect broad areas of the law."
St. Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of HHS, 810 F.2d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.).
45. The court of course would give special consideration to the agency's interpretation
and affirm it if it proved to be correct. See infra text accompanying notes 47-52 (discussing
"Skidmore consideration").
46. See Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946). A delegated power to
promulgate legislative rules does not in itself confer a delegation to promulgate binding
general propositions of law through adjudication. See Berg, Re-Examining Policy Procedures:
The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 149, 169-78 (1986).
47. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977).
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courts in arriving at their own interpretations. The special considera-
tion given the agency construction does not, of course, lead mechan-
ically to acceptance or rejection of the agency view. Rather, as ex-
pressed in Skidmore v. Sift & Co.,4" that view should be given the
significance it deserves:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such
a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thor-
oughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control.4
I shall call this process of judicial analysis "Skidmore consideration."
Under this approach, the agency interpretation is a substantial input
and counts for something, much as legislative history may count. But
the authoritative act of interpretation remains with the court. The
court considers the agency view, and approves it only if it is deemed
correct °
48. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The agency interpretations in the Skidmore case were set
forth in an "interpretative bulletin" (interpretive rules), "informal rulings" and a brief
amicus curiae.
49. Id. at 140. Professor Diver comments: "Of course, the 'weight' assigned to any
advocate's position is presumably dependent upon 'the thoroughness evident in its
consideration' and the 'validity of its reasoning.'" Diver, supra note 3, at 565.
50. The same approach was observed in another leading case, in which interpretive
guidelines published in the Code of Federal Regulations were overturned:
In evaluating this contention [that "great deference"should be accorded the agency
view] it should first be noted that Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer
upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that Tide.
[citation omitted] This does not mean that EEOC guidelines are not entitled to
consideration in determining legislative intent. But it does mean that courts
properly may accord less weight to such guidelines than to administrative
regulations which Congress has declared shall have the force of law, or to
regulations which under the enabling statute may themselves supply the basis for
imposition of liability. [citation omitted] The most comprehensive statement of the
role of interpretative rulings such as the EEOC guidelines is found in Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). where the Court said [quoting the passage
from that case set forth above].
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976)(citations omitted). See also
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock Repair & Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 290 (1946)(citations omitted)
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Under Skidmore, the weight given the agency interpretation, and
the ultimate determination to adopt it as correct or to overturn it,
usually depend on a variety of circumstances or "factors," such as
the importance of agency expertise, contemporaneity of the inter-
pretation with enactment of the statute, longstanding application and
consistency of the agency interpretation, the possibility of congres-
sional acquiescence, and numerous others." These factors are often
the same as those which, in other contexts, could help the court
determine whether Congress delegated interpretive authority to the
agency, or whether the agency interpretation was a reasonable one. 2
D. bward Clarity in the Pre-Chevron Law
Reliance on such a process of weighing multiple and perhaps
incommensurable factors can yield unpredictable results and unsure
doctrine." This is unavoidable, but tolerable, provided it is clear in
each case what question the weighing process is aiming to resolve.
The courts compounded the pre-Chevron uncertainty, however,
through imprecise and inconsistent language. No Supreme Court
case had set forth a comprehensive statement to guide the review of
agency interpretations. The relevant pronouncements were partial
and varied, scattered among the cases.
Two tendencies were especially inimical to clarity. First, the pre-
Chevron opinions suggested that the reviewing courts through the
weighing process should recognize degrees of deference,5 4 even
though the issues were not those of degree but were binary: Did the
resorted to for guidance" but "are not made in adversary proceedings and are not entitled
to the weight which is accorded interpretations by administrative agencies entrusted with
the responsibility of making inter partes decisions").
51. Diver, supra note 3, at 562 n.95 presents a "partial list" of ten such "factors."
See also General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
52. Such factors are usefully grouped as 1) those affecting the probability that the
agency's interpretation was sound (e.g., that the agency had helped draft the statute or had
interpreted it soon after enactment under the eye of Congress; that the agency's
interpretations were consistent and of long standing; that the agency position is well-
reasoned) and 2) those affecting the likelihood that Congress intended to delegate
interpretive authority to the agency (e.g., technical nature of the issue; complexity of the
statute; need to reconcile conflicting statutory policies in administration; absence of
constitutional issues). See Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC. 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986, 996-99 (1987) (by Eric Braun).
53. See Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing
Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1, 39-45 (1971).
54. See cases cited in supra notes 13-14. See also Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97-98 and n.8 (1983); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273
(1981).
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agency possess delegated interpretive power, or not? Was the agency
interpretation reasonable, or not? Was the agency interpretation
correct, or not? Second, the opinions did not differentiate among
these three issues by indicating which "factors" were to be heeded,
and how they were to be used, in the resolution of each respective
issue.5 5 Instead, the opinions typically spoke in general language, as
though the same approaches and the same considerations applied to
all agency interpretations."
Such language lent itself to confusion and misunderstanding. It
tended to blur the distinction between those interpretations that
should be examined for reasonableness and those to be examined
for correctness. It could be taken to justify a subjective judicial
approach, emphasizing reasonableness. And, overall, these opinions
intimated the existence of a generalized concept of "deference" for
all cases, seemingly urging that any agency interpretation, once found
reasonable and consistent with the statute, should be accepted by the
reviewing court.57
But the review of agency interpretations can be more concisely
summarized, consistently with the outcomes if not always with the
pronouncements of the pre-Chevron decisions. In each case the
comprehensive inquiry was, in effect, to determine Congress's
"interpretive intent. '"" That is, did Congress intend that such an
interpretation, in the format used, should bind the courts? An
agency interpretation would be upheld if it: 1) expressed a substan-
tive congressional intent on the point; or 2) was not contrary to
statute, was within authority delegated to the agency to interpret
with the force of law in the format used, and was reasonable; or 3)
accorded with the court's independent construction. This broad
structure continues after Chevron.
55. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566-69 (1980); Train v.
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 75, 87 (1975); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
56. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8
(1983); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1981); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
444 U.S. 555, 566-69 (1980); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
57. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Monaghan, supra note 3, at 30.
58. This useful phrase is suggested for a slightly different context by Note, supra note
52, defining the term as "Congress's preference for resolution of statutory gaps by the
courts or by the agency." Id. at 996 n.82.
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III. The Chevron Doctrine
The Court in Chevron reviewed Environmental Protection Agency
legislative rules that set forth the agency's interpretation of a
statutory term. 9 The Clean Air Act authorized and imposed limita-
tions upon emissions from a "stationary source." The EPA regula-
tions interpreted this statute by use of its "bubble concept," allowing
the states to treat all pollution sources within the same plant as
though they were comprised within a single "source," so that
polluting emissions could be aggregated and netted out for purposes
of complying with regulatory limits.
The District of Columbia Circuit found that Congress had no
specific intent with respect to whether the term "stationary source"
could be interpreted in accordance with the bubble concept. That
court performed its own interpretation, based largely on the general
purposes of the amended Clean Air Act, and set aside the regula-
tions. 6°
The Supreme Court reversed, finding the regulations to be a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting statutory policies in a
situation where Congress had no specific intent with respect to that
precise interpretive question. For the Court, Justice Stevens stated:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always,
is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.
59. For clarity, it should be borne in mind that legislative rules like those in
Cheron--statutorily authorized and properly promulgated after notice and comment and
having the force of law--often embody interpretations of statutes. But they do not thereby
become "interpretative rules," which carry less force and can be promulgated more
informally. See Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), (c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d) (1982).
60. NRDC, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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"The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199, 231 (1974). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to
an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of an agency.
We have long recognized that considerable weight should
be accorded to an executive department's construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the prin-
ciple of deference to administrative interpretations "has been
consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the
meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the
statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon
more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters sub-
jected to agency regulations."'
The Chevron opinion thus set up a three-stage analysis to be
followed by a reviewing court: (1) Is there specific congressional
intent on the precise question at issue? (2) If not, is there express
delegation of authority to elucidate by regulation? (3) If not, is there
implicit delegation of some sort of authority to fill the gap? Courts
and commentators have tended to conflate the second and third
stages into a single inquiry, tested by reasonableness. 2 I will yield
to the widespread usage that calls the first question "Step 1" and
merges the second and third questions into a "Step 2." Since there
are important reasons for keeping the latter two inquiries distinct,
61. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 (quoting United States v. Shirmer, 367 U.S. 374, 382
(1961)).
62. See, e.g., International Union, UMW v. FMSHRC, 840 F.2d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir.
1988); NRDC, Inc., v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1986); FAIC Securities, Inc.
v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1985)("A permissible construction has been
helpfully defined as 'one that is sufficiently reasonable to be accepted by a reviewing
court'); Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 287-88 (1986).
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I will sometimes refer separately to the second question as "Step 2A"
and the third as "Step 2B."
Considerable ambiguity attends both Steps."' That ambiguity has
impaired the development of clear doctrine about which interpretive
formats bind the courts.
A. Chevron's "Step 1"
Step 1, of course, interplays with Step 2. The smaller the scope
of the issue or issues to be resolved in Step 1, the larger is the
ambit of Step 2. The variation will depend upon how far the
Chevron Step 1 language is to be read literally, so as to permit the
court to ask only whether "Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue," with an intent that is "clear."" A literal
reading straitens the scope for independent judicial interpretation in
Step 1, spilling all other judicial inquiries into the Step 2 considera-
tion of the agency's interpretation and its reasonableness.
The next three subsections examine this version of Step 1 and
two variant patterns suggested by words and deeds of the Supreme
Court. Two analytical aspects of each pattern are especially sig-
nificant: What is the nature of the issue as to which congressional
intent is to be sought in Step 1? And how clear must congressional
intent concerning that question be, to bind the agency?
1. Interpreting for Conformity with Specific Intent
Under the language of Chevron, the question to be addressed by
the court is the specific one addressed by the agency's interpretation.
The reviewing court should interpret the statute only so far as is
necessary to determine whether there is a clear and unambiguous
congressional intent toward that precise question. The court may
employ the "traditional tools of statutory construction" to ascertain
the existence of such an intent.6 If it finds specific intent on the
63. See Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Get Judicial Deference?-A Preliminary
Inquity, 40 ADMiN. L. R v. 121, 126-28, 130-33 (1988).
64. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
65. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. See infra note 83 for the full quotation. According to
Chevron, the tools of interpretation for Step 1 do not include the broad statutory purposes:
imposing its own construction based on the broad purposes (where it could not find specific
intent) is just what the Chevron Court reversed the lower court for doing. 467 U.S. at 842-
44. See Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681, 688-
89 (1986) (neither court nor agency can correct statute's inadequacies in implementing
putative statutory purposes). But see Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 126
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precise question, the court should affirm or vacate the agency
interpretation accordingly. But if it fails to find such intent, the
court should not then use the "traditional tools" to perform an
independent interpretation of the ambiguous statute. Instead, it
should move to Step 2 and evaluate the agency's interpretation.
Does this doctrine result in fewer occasions in which a court may
interpret independently? Manifestly it does, even though exact
meanings cannot be placed upon the words "precise" and "specific,"
which limit the issues now amenable to independent resolution. Prior
cases showed a tendency for the courts to interpret independently
when pure questions or major questions were involved and primary
interpretive authority had not been delegated to the agencies.6 But
now such issues seem less likely to be determined independently.
Obviously, specific congressional intent directed to such issues often
cannot be found.67 When it cannot, Chevron seems to tell the
(1985) (accept agency view "unless the legislative history or the purpose and structure of
the statute dearly reveal a contrary intent on the part of Congress"); Hall v. Lyng, 828
F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpreting on basis of general purposes of statute); see also
McNabb v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying dictum from FEC v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981), that courts "must reject
administrative regulations . . . that frustrate the policies which Congress sought to
implement").
The general purposes of the statute are of substantial importance when testing the
reasonableness of the agency interpretation in Step 2. Continental Air lines v. Dep't of
Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See infra text accompanying notes 115-
19.
In some circumstances the agency interpretation itself can be an appropriate tool for
the court's use in Step 1, as where the agency helped frame the statute, see SEC v. Collier,
76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935), and where the interpretation continues to reflect initial
agency views acquiesced in by Congress, see Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933). See also Strauss, One Hundred Fifry Cases Per Year: Some
Implicatwns of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
COLUM. L. Riv. 1093, 1125 (1987).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 29-46.
67. Hochberg, "Two-Step Method of Analysis: Still in Transition After Chevron," Nat'l L.J.,
May 16, 1988, at 22 n.13, cites six Supreme Court decisions in which majority and dissent
divided over whether Congress had a precise intent, and over what it was. Sometimes the
courts appear to strain to find congressional intent to avoid accepting the agency
interpretation. See Int'l Union, UMW v. FMSHRC, 840 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Bracamontes v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 840 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1988).
Professor Levin suggests that the "precise question at issue" need not be a narrow issue,
such as "has Congress talked about the bubble (or whatever the factual situation might be)?
No? Then on to Step Two." Instead, "sometimes the precise question framed by the
parties can be a fairly broad question, one that requires identifying the broad purposes or
the analytical framework that the statute contemplates." Levin, et al., Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 AoMIN. L. REv. 353, 377 (1987) (transcript of
panel discussion presented at Fall Meeting of ABA Admin. Law Section). Whatever the
issue, he proposes that in Step 1 the court should "[extract] all the guidance that it can
possibly get out of the statute" before giving up the quest for precise intent and moving
to Step 2. Id. at 376.
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reviewing court to review the agency interpretation only for reason-
ableness 8 rather than to decide independently, as it might have
done in a similar case before Chevron was decided.
2. "Pure Questions" of Interpretation
But at least four Justices have put forth a variation on Step 1,
concerning interpretations that present "pure question[s] of statutory
construction,"U which may substantially diminish these effects. It was
first advanced in the 1987 Cardoza-Fonseca71 case by Justice Stevens,
who had been the author of the Chevron opinion. With the concur-
rence of four others, he declared for the Court that pure questions
"are for the courts to decide."''1 He said that the "narrow legal
question" is "quite different from the question of interpretation that
arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply [stan-
dards from the statutes in question] to a particular set of facts; 7
as to the latter, a court under Chevron must respect the inter-
pretation of the agency. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment,
sharply disapproved Justice Stevens's language as gratuitously
subversive of Chevron.7'
The "pure question" idea appeared again in Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court in the 1987 United Food Workers case .7  He
pointedly substituted Cardoza-Fonseca for Chevron in Step 1, stating:
We review the validity of the relevant regulations, promul-
gated pursuant to congressional authority, under the standards
prescribed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca .... On a pure question
of statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine
congressional intent, using "traditional tools of statutory
construction." . .. Id. See also Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43,
and n. 9. However, where "the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
68. 467 U.S. at 842-44, 865-66.
69. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987);
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
70. 480 U.S. at 446. In Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S.
221 (1986), Justice White, for the Court, viewed the issue as "a purely legal question of
statutory interpretation," id. at 230, which he decided by accepting the agency's interpreta-
tion upon finding it reasonable.
71. 480 U.S. at 446.
72. Id. at 448. The interpretive issue in Chevron was arguably a pure question. See
supra text accompanying notes 29, 59-60.
73. Id. at 452.
74. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
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whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Id., at 843 . . . . Under this
principle, we have traditionally accorded the Board deference
with regard to its interpretation of the NLRA as long as its
interpretation is rational and consistent with the statute.75
The Court found the statutory plan ambiguous as to the specific
matter dealt with in the agency's construction, which it held
reasonable.76 Justice Scalia concurred specially, for himself and three
others," declaring that the Court's decision demonstrated the
unchanged vitality of Chevron in the face of mistaken understandings
of dicta in Cardoza-Fonseca:75 If those dicta had been applied here, he
said, the interpretive question at issue surely would have been a
pure one, rather than one of applying a statutory standard to
particular facts, and the Court could not have upheld the agency's
view, as it in fact did, merely by finding it reasonable.
If Chevron at its strongest requires judicial acceptance of reason-
able agency interpretations on all issues as to which the statutes are
silent or ambiguous, its range of applicability would shrink substan-
tially under a doctrine permitting independent judicial decision of
pure questions. A reviewing court could readily identify even a
minor interpretive issue as "pure," on the ground that it was general
in nature and not dependent upon the specific facts of any case.
Then, even if the court did not find a clear and unambiguous
intent, it would not move to a Step 2 consideration of the agency's
interpretation, as indicated by Chevron." Instead, it would remain in
Step 1 and employ the "traditional tools of statutory construction"8
75. Id. at 421.
76. Id. at 422.
77. Id. at 426. Joining Justice Scalia were Justice O'Connor, who had joined the
Stevens opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. A vacancy
on the Court existed at the time of the United Food Workers decision. Thus, the four justices
asserting a pure question doctrine are Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
78. Id. Canom-Fonseca had been understood in several lower court cases as
permitting acceptance of a reasonable agency view only where the question was a mixed
one of applying law to fact, or perhaps where the reviewing court could not discern a
congressional intent by its own independent interpretive processes, using traditional tools
of statutory construction. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Regular Common Carrier Conf. v. U.S., 820 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Adams
House Health Care v. Heckler, 817 F.2d 587, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1987); International Union,
UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 764-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also Costello v. Agency for
Int'l Dev., 843 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
79. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
80. NLRB v. United Food & Com'l Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987)
(quoting INS v. Cardoza-Foneca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
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to divine congressional intent on the pure question."t Obviously,
since such pure question cases would never leave Step 1, the
occasions for acceptance of agency interpretations under Step 2
would be fewer."
Their words asserting independent interpretation for pure
questions have been cryptic, and the four justices may not have
intended any such large inroad into the strong Chevron principle.
Justice Stevens's original mention of a "pure question" in the
Cardoza-Fonseca opinion was immediately followed by quotation of a
footnote from his Chevron opinion, which declared that a court must
give effect to the clear congressional intention, if there is one, on
"the precise question at issue.""3 He thus gives the appearance of
using the term "pure question" as a synonym for the "precise
question at issue." In the passage quoted above from United Food
Workers,"' Justice Brennan may have done the same thing: he
substituted "pure question" language in Step 1, and then seemingly
referred to it in Step 2 as the "specific issue." If so, the Chevron
rules for "precise questions" would govern "pure questions.""
81. This approach was taken in International Union, UMW v. FMSHRC, 840 F.2d
77 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Citing Cardoza-Fonseca, a different panel of the District of Columbia
Circuit has asserted: "When the court faces 'a pure question of statutory construction,' the
court need not defer to the agency opinion, even if the statutoly provision at issue admits of some
ambiguity. [Citations]. In such instances, the court is to use traditional tools of statutory
construction to ascertain congressional intent." Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824
F.2d 108, 113 (1987)(Mikva, J.)(emphasis added). Judge Stephen Williams in concurrence
objected to "unceremoniously dumping our rule of deference to reasonable agency
interpretations in areas of statutory ambiguity." Id. at 121. See also Huffman v. Western
Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 673 n.9 (1988).
82. Courts have suggested in dictum that a "pure question case" could move to Step
2 in the limited situation "when a court is unable to discern congressional intent after
employing traditional tools of statutory construction." International Union, UAW v. Brock,
816 F.2d 761, 765 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also NLRB Union v. FLRA. 834 F.2d 191
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
83. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447-48, quoting the entire text of Chevron
footnote 9, as follows: "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construc-
tion and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to dear congressional
intent. [Citing cases.] If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention
is the law and must be given effect." 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
84. Text accompanying supra note 75.
85. See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Judge
Starr identified the issue as a "pure question," and approached it through a search for clear
intent on that precise question, as called for by the language of Chevron. 467 U.S. at 842-
43 and n.9. After extensive review of the statute and its legislative history,, he found a
"clear Congressional intent" contrary to the position taken in the agency's regulation. 824
F.2d at 1190. Judge Mikva, dissenting, thought the statute ambiguous enough that the
court should have accepted the agency's interpretation under Chevron. Id. at 1194.
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If this latter view of the "pure question" inquiry reflects what the
justices have intended, though, it is hard to see what the controversy
is about, since the new language of "pure question" will have
worked no real change. It would not diminish the agencies' ability
under Chevron to interpret statutes in ways that the courts must
accept.
If the "pure question" notion means anything more expansive
than this, it implicates the delegation inquiry that inheres in every
agency interpretation case." The four Justices seem to have been
saying that, to the extent a question is a pure one, the courts will
presume that Congress did not assign the primary interpretive
authority to the agency. This is consistent with the analysis of pre-
Chevron case law, above.87 On the other hand, the pure question
language has been put forward with no apparent regard for the
possibility that delegations can occur, even where pure questions are
involved. 8 In a given case a reviewing court may find that Congress
did give the agency the primary power to resolve the pure question.
Recognizing this possibility, at the least, seems necessary to conform
to Chevron's mandate that agency interpretations, if reasonable, be
accepted whenever an "express" or "implicit" delegation to interpret
is found. 9
Until the subject of "pure questions" is clarified, it cannot be
known how much Chevron affects the prior practice. If Chevron
appeared to reverse the presumption that no delegation exists in
pure question cases, Cardoza-Fonseca and United Food Workers may
have restored it.
3. Interpreting for Violation of Statute
In the Dimension Financial case, the Court quoted from the
Chevron Step 1 language, and added to it the corollary that the
"traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation is not to
be applied to alter the dearly expressed intent of Congress."9 This
obvious proposition, which would seem to reach any agency inter-
pretation that violates any statute, calls for a more general inquiry
86. See text accompanying supra notes 9-16; text accompanying infra notes 149-52.
87. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
88. See NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co; 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956).
89. 467 U.S. at 843-44, 865-66.
90. Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
368 (1986).
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than does the Chevron text.9' Even though it speaks of the situation
where the intent of the statute is "clearly expressed," it is not
thereby speaking of Congress's specific intent on the precise point at
issue. An agency interpretation could be struck down under Step 1
even where no such specific congressional focus on the precise issue
could be found, so long as the agency action violated a generally
stated statute whose clear intent precluded the agency's view. This
view can be taken of the statutory intent used to strike down the
regulations in Dimension, though it may be arguable that the Court
found specific intent on the narrow points at issue. The use of
general rather than specific statutory intent to strike down an agency
interpretation seems clearer in the 1988 K Mart" case. There
individual justices, in shifting combinations of concurrences and
dissents, voted to invalidate one or more of the regulations involved,
although a majority struck down only one of them."' The votes to
invalidate all appear to be based on the simple proposition that the
regulations violated the statute, rather than on the perception that
Congress harbored a specific intent which the agency failed to
observe."
This approach makes it a part of Step 1 to ask whether the
agency interpretation affronts any clearly expressed statutory
91. See United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 666 (1986)("We must uphold
that [agency] interpretation if the statute yields up no definitive contrary command and if
the agencies' approach is a reasonable one"); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Amer. Cetacean Soc'y.,
478 U.S. 221, 233 (1986) 'thc Secretary is not forbidden [to interpret as he did]");
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) ("if Congress has clearly expressed
an intent contrary to that of the Agency, our duty is to enforce the will of Congress");
Edwards v. McMahon, 834 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1987); Hall v. Lyng, 828 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.
1987); Brock v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Barnett v.
Weinberger, 818 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Nevada ex rel. Loux v. Herrington, 777 F.2d
529 (9th Cir. 1985); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 647 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D.
La. 1986); see also Sunstein, Constit lism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. RFv. 421,
468-69 (1987): "Congress rarely addresses precise questions directly.... The question is
not whether Congress had directly addressed the precise issue, but whether the statute
requires or forbids the relevant administrative action."
92. K Mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
93. 108 S.Ct. at 1818. Two parts of the regulations were upheld after the Court
found "statutory ambiguity" and "imprecision in the statute," so that "the agency is entitled
to choose any reasonable definition."
94. Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and four others, stated: "If the agency
regulation is not in conflict with the plain language [intent?] of the statute, a reviewing
court must give deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute." Id. at 1817. He
then went forward to strike down the one regulation on the ground that it could be
supported "under no reasonable construction of the statutory language. .. ." Id. at 1818.
Justice Scalia, for himself and three others, would also have stricken down two other
regulations he determined to be "in conflict" with a statute he found "unambiguous." Id
at 1831.
Interpretive Formats and the Force of Law
intention, general or specific. It seems eminently sensible to do so.
One may cavil that the Court, in the key language of Chevron quoted
above, seemed to assign to Step 2 the issue of whether an inter-
pretation pursuant to delegated authority was "manifestly contrary
to the statute," or "reasonable" (with the matter of statutory
compliance to be treated as part of the reasonableness question)."
But the Court has since acted otherwise. The approach implemented
by its actions embodies normal judicial behavior. And it has the
merit of simplicity, placing all questions of violation of statute into
Step 1.
Under this formulation of Step 1, the agency interpretation must
be upheld if it is congruent with a dear congressional intent on the
precise issue (or pure question). 6 But if it is contrary to that intent,
or contrary to the clear intent of any statute, the court will strike it
down without proceeding to Step 2.' If no statute so mandates or
precludes the agency view, the court moves to Step 2.
B. Chevron's "Step 2"
In Step 2, the court evaluates the agency interpretation, and
accepts it if it is reasonable. More precisely, if it finds "an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision
of the statute by regulation,"" the court must accept the agency
interpretation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute."" This is Step 2A. Alternatively, if it does not
find an express delegation but perceives an "implicit" "delegation to
[the] agency on [the] particular question," the court must accept a
"reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of [the]
agency."'" This is Step 2B.
95. 467 U.S. at 844. In a nearby footnote, the Court stated: "The judiciary is the
final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative construc-
tions which are contrary to dear congressional intent." 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9.
96. E.g., Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, 644 F. Supp. 1381, 1391 (C.D.Cal.
1986). This is not an instance of the agency's view binding the court, however, since the
governing act of interpretation is that of the court ascertaining the intent of Congress. See
Levin, supra note 3 at 25.
97. The intent must appear "dearly" to avoid trenching upon the agencies' legitimate
power, under Chievron, to interpret ambiguities in statutes entrusted to their administration.
See Justice Stevens's use of the phrase "manifestly contrary to statute" in the second
paragraph of the key passage from Chevron quoted above, text at note 61. But see
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 838 F.2d
627 (2nd Cir. 1988); Levin, supra note 67.
98. 467 U.S. at 843-44.
99. Id. at 844.
100. Id. at 844.
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For both branches of Step 2, the central passage of Chevron, just
paraphrased,"'1 rather plainly calls for a reviewing court to find an
appropriate delegation before the court becomes bound to accept an
agency interpretation on the basis of its reasonableness. Accordingly,
before assessing reasonableness the court must not only determine
in Step 1 that Congress did not have a contrary intent, but it also
must affirmatively answer the delegation inquiry at the threshold of
Step 2. These two propositions in my opinion correctly state the law,
although other language in Chevron indicates a special way of
understanding the second one.0 2 The matter is central to the
analysis of interpretive formats, and will be treated presently, after
a brief review of how Step 2 acceptance of agency interpretations
works.
1. Judicial Acceptance of Reasonable Agency Interp retations
Despite persistent judicial talk of weight and degrees of defer-
ence, 03 it is wholly dear that the agency interpretation, if found
reasonable, must be accepted by the reviewing court."° The "court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation" by the agency.' 5 Indeed, the mood of
deference toward agency views, which permeated the Chevron
opinion, has engendered some extravagant formulations' and some
101. The passage is set forth in ful in text accompanying supra note 61.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 134-71.
103. See, e.g., Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 381 (1987)(plurality opinion); FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438 (1986); Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 745
(D.C. Cir. 1984). Even in Chevron, Justice Stevens spoke of according "considerable weight"
to the agency construction. 467 U.S. at 844.
104. See FAIC Securities v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Scalia,
J.); Starr, supra note 62, at 296 (in contrast to some pre-Chevron cases, courts "must give
controlling weight" to the agency interpretation).
105. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. For an illustration of a court accepting an agency
interpretation that it might not prefer but found reasonable, see Council of Commuter
Orgs. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d. 879, 886 (2nd Cir. 1986).
But where the statute is not within the agency's special competency, its ambiguities are
to be resolved by the court. See Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1134 (3rd Cir.
1988) (Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts); see also Center for Science in the Public
Interest v. Regan, 802 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Equal Access to Justice Act).
106. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Amer. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 233 (1986)
(defer to agency construction "unless the legislative history of the enactment shows with
sufficient clarity that the agency construction is contrary to the will of Congress"); Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985) ("defer to (agency] view unless the
legislative history or the purpose and structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary
intent on the part of Congress"); Todd v. Norman, 840 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1988)
(conferral of broad authority upon agency in Social Security matters "insulates his
administrative interpretations from a judicial override, unless that interpretation is
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pointed ripostes.1°7 It seems agreed that the agencies' power has
been enhanced by the requirement that their reasonable interpreta-
tions be accepted by the courts."'
To be sustained as reasonable, the agency interpretation need not
be the only permissible one, and if reasonable it will be upheld even
though the court might have construed the statute differently."° The
agency may change its view, provided the new interpretation is
consistent with statute and reasonable,"' and the change was based
on reasoned decisionmaking, adequately explained."' Thus, there
need be no single true and enduring interpretation."' Where
Congress has not definitively spoken, agency interpretation is largely
a matter of discretionary policymaking, the "wisdom" of which is of
'manifestly contrary to the statute.' Chevron. . ."); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824
F.2d 1177, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (dissenting opinion) ("EPA need demonstrate only that
its definition of solid waste does not dearly contradict congressional intent"); Humane Soc'y
of U.S. v. EPA, 790 F.2d 106, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986)("we perceive no inconsistency between
EPA's interpretation .. .and the legislative history of the Act. We thus are obliged to
accept the agency's reading"); NLRB v. Manley Truck Line, 779 F.2d 1327, 1331 (7th Cir.
1985).
107. See Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("The task of interpreting a statute requires more than merely inventing an
ambiguity and invoking administrative deference"); American Financial Serv. v. FTC, 767
F.2d 957, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dissenting opinion) (the "court [was] anesthetized by a
misplaced deference to agency authority").
108. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 465-69 (1987); Mikva, How Should Courts Treat
Adiministrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1986); NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410,
430 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(Wald, J.) ("The agency's response is also a reasonable interpretation
of congressional intent, and in that situation the agency always wins under Chevron").
109. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125
(1985). See Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
110. "The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of
the term "source" does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no deference
should be accorded the agency's interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpreta-
tion is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64.
111. See id. at 863; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 42-43, 57 (1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 871 F.2d 149, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Continental Air Lines v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1987); Cf. Strauss, supra
note 65, at 1129-35 (resolving tension between Chevron and Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n).
112. "An ambiguous legal rule does not have a single 'right' meaning; there is a
range of possible meanings; the selection from the range is an act of policymaking. The
person who fleshes out the meaning of the rule is the true law-givei in the circumstances."
Homemakers N. Shore, Inc., 832 F.2d at 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (emphasis
added). See also infra note 170.
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no concern to a reviewing court."' Indeed, it has been suggested
that in such circumstances (that is, where the court has moved to
Step 2), the scope of review for statutory interpretations should be
assimilated to that for policy judgments made independently of
specific statutory language or made under empty standards such as
"the public interest.""' 4
How is the "reasonableness" of the agency interpretation to be
evaluated?" 5 Justice White has said: "[O]ur review is limited to the
question whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, policies
and legislative history of the Act .... P.. Judge Starr has stated that
"reasonableness in this context is to be determined by reference both
to the agency's textual analysis (broadly defined, including where
appropriate resort to legislative history) and to the compatibility of
that inquiry with the Congressional purposes informing the
measure."" 7 The latter branch of this inquiry does not warrant a
judicial search for the interpretation that "best promotes" the legisla-
113. "When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it
is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail."
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. See Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1549 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). There may be an uncertain line between contentions that go to wisdom and
those that go to reasonableness, in light of the way the latter is to be tested. See infra notes
115-27 and accompanying text.
114. Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. Rv. 301 (1988). But see Continental Air Lines, 843 F.2d at
1452; Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363 (1986)
(distinguishing interpretations, which involve questions of law, from policy determinations,
which do not, and recognizing (but not advocating) distinct standards for judicial review of
each category). See also Levin, supra note 3, at 12, 25.
Justice Stevens's Chevron formulation (467 U.S. at 844) of the test in Step 2A, for
legislative regulations interpreting statutes, uses the words "arbitrary" and "capricious" which
are part of the APA standard (see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)) used to review policy determina-
tions (see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41
(1983)); perhaps, therefore, these tests can be regarded as identical so far as they are not
concerned with violations of statutes. (For the content of that standard, see id. at 41-45;
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971)). But for Step 2B,
involving interpretations pursuant to implicit delegations, Justice Stevens specified simply
that the interpretation must be "reasonable." Reasonableness may establish a standard
theoretically different from those of Step 2A and APA § 706(2)(A). See infra notes 128-31
and accompanying text.
For a decision applying Chevron Step 2A to the ICC's interpretation of the broad term
"reasonable," see Drug & Toilet Preparation Traffic Conf. v. United States, 797 F.2d 1054,
1057-58 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
115. As remarked, courts and commentators almost universally merge Steps 2A and
2B into a single "reasonableness" inquiry. See, supra note 62.
116. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
117. Continental Air Lines, 843 F.2d at 1449. By the language "in this context"
Judge Starr may be contrasting the instant case with the Step 2A "paradigm" of expressly-
delegated legislative rules; if so, the quoted passage refers only to Step 2B.
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tive purpose;"' rather, the court should decide whether the agency
reasonably explained how the interpretation serves the statutory
objectives and whether the interpretation frustrates congressional
policy. 9
In their Step 2 assessments, courts often identify factors or
considerations that enlarge or diminish their perceptions of agency
reasonableness.' 20 Excellently summarized in the recent literature,'
those that enhance reasonableness include the importance of agency
expertise in a technical or complex area, detailed and reasonable
consideration by the agency, the need to reconcile conflicting
policies, 22 congressional grant to the agency of explicit rulemaking
authority, interpretation contemporaneous with the agency's setting
the statutory machinery into motion, congressional awareness of the
agency view and rejection of changes, and the consistency with which
the agency interpretation has been applied.' Considerations
militating against the reasonableness of an agency interpretation
include concern that it may raise constitutional questions, 2 " flawed
118. Id. at 1451.
119. Id. at 1452-53 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863, and FEC v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981)). Judge Starr suggests that this inquiry is
different from and less exacting than that under the arbitrary-and-capricious analysis
articulated in Overton Park and State Farm. Starr, supra note 62, at 298. See, e.g., Cablevision
Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 1154 (D.D.C. 1986) (agency interpretation
unreasonable as contrary to statutory purposes); Oliver v. Ledbetter, 624 F. Supp. 325, 330
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (agency interpretation reasonable as consistent with statutory purposes).
The attention given to statutory objectives in Step 2 contrasts interestingly with
the process in Step 1. There, even when the reviewing court cannot find specific
congressional intent, it may not form its own interpretation derived from perceived statutory
purposes, as it might properly do if no agency interpretation were in the picture. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843. See supra note 65.
120. As noted, some of these factors can bear upon inquiries as to whether a
delegation to interpret exists or whether an agency position is correct. See supra notes 51-
52 and accompanying text.
121. See Diver, supra note 3, at 562 n.95 (1985); Woodward & Levin, In Defense of
Deference: Judiciol Review of Agency Action, 81 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 332-36 (1979); Note,
supra note 52, at 997-1002; Hochberg, supra note 67, at text accompanying nn.26-33.
122. The three factors just listed were cited in the Chevron opinion. 467 U.S. at 865.
123. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 120
n.20 (1987)(contemporaneous interpretation and consistency of intepretations); Bowen v.
Amer. Hosp. Ass'n., 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (consistency of interpretation); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (congressional awareness); Mas-
sachusetts v. United States Dep't of Educ., 837 F.2d 536, 543 (1st Cir. 1988) (expertise);
Barnett v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 953, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (detailed consideration);
Production Workers Union v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (conflicting policies);
Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 749 F.2d 89, 96 (1st Cir. 1984) (explicit rulemaking
authority). But see supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
124. See DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const., 485 U.S. 568 (1988);
Note, supra note 52, at 1002-03 (1987).
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agency reasoning and inadequate explanation, 5 inconsistency of
agency positions,'" and agency self-aggrandizement." 7
The Chevron opinion separately stated the standards of judicial
scrutiny for Steps 2A and 2B respectively,'28 and a few courts have
discerned an operational difference, or the possibility of one. 2 ' It is
quite thinkable that interpretations set forth in expressly authorized
legislative regulations should trigger less scrutiny than those set forth
in other ways.s And it is at least imaginable that Chevron's differenti-
ated formulations can be given differentiated practical applications.131
Whatever may be the significance of these distinctions, though,
there is another far more important reason to keep Steps 2A and
2B distinct. That is to assure that reviewing courts, especially in Step
2B cases, consciously ask whether there is a delegation authorizing
the agency's interpretation. All Step 2A cases involve legislative
125. See, e.g., Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987);
Brock on behalf of Williams v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Brock v.
Louvers and Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FERC,
792 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
126. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446 n.30. But see supra notes 110, 112.
"The very meaning of the second stage, emphasized in Chevron, is that within the zone of
indeterminacy, an agency is free to change its view-and the obligation of the courts to
accept the changed view is not altered by the fact of the change." Strauss, supra note 65,
at 1125. See Hicks v. Cantrell, 803 F.2d 789, 793 (4th Cir. 1986).
127. See Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 383; Sunstein,
supra note 91, at 468; Note, supra note 52, at 1005-07; Larinoff v. United States, 533 F.2d
1167, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affid, 431 U.S. 864 (1977). Analytically, however, it can be
asserted that the scope of an agency's authority is implicated every time it interprets its
own statute. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944). Presumably
a line might be drawn somewhere between, for example, assertion of power over new
subject matter (see Winter, The Quiche Brief, Regulation, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 31) or "the
unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by
Congress," (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983),
(quoting American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965))) and, on the
other hand, the expert filling of interstices in the everyday administration of the statute (see
St. Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of HHS, 810 F.2d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.)).
128. See quoted text accompanying notes 61, 98-100; supra note 113.
129. See Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 151 (D.C. Cir.
1984)("language in Chevron might be read to indicate that the appropriate standard of
review in such a situation varies to some degree dependent on whether the statute's
delegation of gap filling authority is explicit or implicit")(Wald, C.J.); Delaware Div. of
Health and Soc. Serv. v. HHS, 665 F. Supp. 1104, 1120 (D.De. 1987) (Step 2B standard
is "less deferential than the arbitrary and capricious standard"); Panzarino v. Heckler, 624
F. Supp. 350, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (where rulemaking authority "is only implicit, the scope
of our review is somewhat more searching than the 'arbitrary, capricious or manifestly
contrary to statute' standard"); Hochberg, supra note 67, at 27 n.34. See also supra note 119.
But see authorities cited supra note 60.
130. See text at supra note 17; infra text at notes 204-12.
131. But Justice Frankfurter warned of "the intractability of any formula to furnish
definiteness of content fir all the impalpable factors involved in judicial review." Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
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regulations authorized by "express delegation,"'32 and that delegation
is usually so easy to find that it will pose no issue for the court to
ponder. By contrast, the delegation issue is a vital one for other
kinds of agency interpretations, reviewed by means of Step 2B, in
which the court must actively seek an "implicit" delegation. But in
their practice of merging Steps 2A and 2B into a single reasonable-
ness inquiry, many courts apparently follow the simpler Step 2A and
consequently forget about the delegation issue entirely, even in Step
2B cases where it should be indispensable.
2. The Place of the Delegation Inquiry in Step 2
In review of agency interpretations, the sequence of inquiry is (1)
substantive statutory questions (Step 1),' m (2) the question of
delegation of authority for the interpretation (threshold of Step 2),
and, if there is a sufficient delegation, (3) the question of reasonable-
ness (Step 2).
An affirmative finding of specific substantive intent will usually
decide the case and in any event will clearly preclude any delegation
to the agency to interpret as it has done. A finding that the agency's
interpretation violates a statute will do the same. If the answer to
both of these questions is negative--that is, if statutes do not supply
substantive norms by which the agency interpretation can be
dispositively judged-the reviewing court moves to Step 2. It should
not, however, plunge directly into evaluating the agency interpreta-
tion for reasonableness. The prior and vital inquiry at this point is
whether Congress has delegated to the agency authority for its
interpretation. The Step 2 inquiry is framed thus: First, is issuance
of the interpretation within a delegation of primary authority to
interpret in this fashion? Then, is the interpretation reasonable? If
the answer to either question is negative, the court is not bound to
accept the agency's interpretation.
To bind a court to accept an agency's reasonable construction,
there must certainly be a delegation; 34 what is not certain is whether
such a delegation, where not made expressly, will be presumed to
132. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
133. See text accompanying supra notes 96-97.
134. See text accompanying supra notes 98-102; Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 745
(D.C. Cir. 1984), citing Monaghan, supra not. S. at 25-28 ("[D]eference to an agency's
interpretation constitutes a judicial determination that Congress has delegated the norm-
elaboration function to the agency and that the interpretation falls within the scope of that
delegation").
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have been made implicitly. This may be the most vexing of the
many uncertainties left by Chevron.' Obviously, this question cannot
arise in Step 2A, where only express delegations are involved. But
for Step 2B cases, as to which the Chevron text calls for an "implicit"
delegation, certain passages in Chevron and elsewhere suggest that a
sufficient delegation must be presumed to exist whenever there is a
"gap" in the statute-that is, whenever the statute is silent or
ambiguous on the specific issue, such that the matter cannot be
resolved by judicial interpretation in Step 1.
The formulary paragraphs of Chevron16 offer no guidance about
how the requisite implicit delegation is to be detected. t3 But in
provocative language near the close of his opinion, Justice Stevens
declared that "it matters not" whether Congress consciously wished
the agency to interpret or simply did not consider the specific
question."' This suggests that, by its very silence or ambiguity,
Congress implicitly delegates adequate interpretive authority on the
issue. Justice Stevens reinforced this suggestion by speaking approv-
ingly in the next paragraph of an agency "resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve,
or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency. . .," although he
was there referring to "an agency to which Congress had delegated
135. See Anthony, supra note 63, at 126-27, 130-31.
136. See text accompanying supra note 61.
137. The quotation from Morton v. Ruiz, set forth in text accompanying supra note 61,
may misleadingly color judicial understanding of the later words about implicit delegation.
Morton was not concerned with delegation of interpretive authority in the absence of
rulemaking authority. Rather, the Court stressed the agency's obligation to formulate gap-
filling policy rules where required to establish eligibility among needy Indians in the face
of an inadequate appropriation. Although the quotation in Chevron seems to be taken that
way, Morton does not in any fashion support the notion that a "gap" creates or delegates
any rulemaking or other interpretive power that did not already exist. To the contrary,
it disapproved failure to use existing rulemaking powers sufficiently to meet program needs.
See text accompanying infra notes 154-61. On the significance of Morton v. Ruiz, see Fuchs,
Development and Diversification in Administrative Rulemaking, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 83, 101-02
(1977).
138. Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so
itself on the level of specificity presented by [this case]. Perhaps that
body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better
position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at
this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on
either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take
their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial
purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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policymaking responsibilities ... [acting] within the limits of that
delegation."'3 9
The idea that a "gap" in congressional intention or statutory
language ipso facto delegates all needed interpretive authority, or
something like it, has several times won eminent expression. 40 In
effect these formulations conclusively presume a delegation from the
statutory silence or ambiguity; they omit any search for evidence or
inference about Congress's delegatory intentions.
One may hesitate to accept this proposition, and its suggestion
that delegation has no significant role in Chevron analysis. The
omission of a delegation inquiry would contradict express language 41
and an apparent premise of Chevron: that agency interpretations will
bind the courts when Congress wants them to. Unless the courts will
at least inquire into the delegatory wishes of Congress in particular
cases, they risk thwarting those wishes. A capital judicial respon-
139. Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases,
reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch
of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
140. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(dear
evidence of congressional intent to preclude agency's interpretation is "a necessary
prerequisite here to rebut the inference that Congress meant to delegate to the Secretary
the authority to interpret the general and ambiguous terms") (Wald, CJ.); Nat'l Fuel Gas
Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("When Congress leaves gaps
.. implicitly by enacting an ambiguously worded provision that the agency must interpret,
it has... implicitly delegated to the agency the power to fill those gaps. That delegation
requires the courts to defer to an agency's decision") (Bork, J.); Druimmond Coal Co. v.
Hodel, 796 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Since Congress did not explicitly address the
proper meaning of the words... Congress has left a gap in the regulatory regime for the
agency to fill. . . . We have no warrant to set aside the agency's interpretation, if
reasonable") (Silberman, J.); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 935 (D.C. Cir.
1986)('Chemon teaches that Congress may delegate interpretative authority implicitly-by
failing to legislate in sufficient detail as to resolve a particular question of interpretation")
(Starr, J.). See also Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376 n.3 (1987)(Scalia, J.); Delaware
Div. of Health & Soc. Serv. v. HHS, 665 F. Supp. 1104, 1119 (D. Del. 1987) (Wright. 3.).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 61, 98-100.
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sibility here is to determine what authority has been conferred upon
the agency.4' To forswear the delegation inquiry is to abdicate this
pivotal task, which makes up the bulk of the Marbury duty to say
what the law is in these cases." Elision of the delegation issue
surrenders all opportunity to discriminatingly identify and honor
Congress's interpretive intent in any given case. Moreover, it would
undercut the benefit of national uniformity justly claimed for agency
interpretations.'" If those interpretations are rightfully to displace
the powers of courts nationwide to say what the law is, they should
possess the warrant for doing so that only congressional delegation
of appropriate powers can confer.
But these objections mainly beset only one of the two kinds of
delegation that must exist if the agency's interpretation is to bind the
courts. The Stevens language, like that of the judges just cited,'"
refers to delegation (the first kind) to interpret authoritatively with
respect to the subject matter of the statutory gap. The doctrine that a
gap automatically creates such a delegation is not ordinarily open to
the objections that have just been canvassed, provided the agency's
interpretation is adequately covered by a delegation (the second
kind) to pronounce authoritative interpretations in the format chosen
by the agency. The objections reviewed above go to this second kind
of delegation, and demonstrate the infirmity of any notion that a
gap can automatically provide the requisite delegation as to format.
As to the first kind: Except possibly where they confront "pure
questions," and unless a contrary congressional intent appears,
reviewing courts may properly treat the existence of a gap as a
sufficient delegation of the power to establish interpretations carrying
the force of law on subject matter lying within that gap. When
acting within the gap, the agency is realistically viewed as making
policy, rather than interpreting for a single best meaning, as a court
might do.146 For reasons that are well stated elsewhere, 7 it is both
142. See Monaghan, supra note 3, at 27, citing Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods.,
Inc. 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944).
143. Since the courts retain the capacity independently to adjudge specific statutory
intent in Step I and reasonableness in Step 2, the abdication of this task probably would
not be an unconstitutional abridgement of the court's independence.
144. See Strauss, supra note 65, at 1121-24, 1129-33.
145. See supra note 140.
146. See Pierce, supra note 114; Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d
408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) ("An ambiguous legal rule does not have a single
'right' meaning; there is a range of possible meanings; the selection from the range is an
act of policymaking. The person who fleshes out the meaning of the rule is the true law-
giver in the circumstances").
147. Pierce, supra note 114; Strauss, supra note 65, at 1117-26, 1129-33.
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sound and sensible to look to the agency that exercises related
policymaking responsibilities," and not to the court system, as the
competent organ to fill the substantive interstices.
So far as authority over the subject matter is concerned, then, the gap
can satisfy the requirement, identified above, 49 that a sufficient
delegation be found at the threshold of Step 2. But to grant this
proposition is not to abandon that threshold requirement, for two
reasons. The more important consideration is the need to find a
delegation as to the format, which has been alluded to above and
will be discussed presently. Even keeping within the realm of subject-
matter powers, though, there is reason to retain the delegation
inquiry as an essential part of the analytical structure. So long as the
Supreme Court holds open the possibility that "pure questions of
statutory construction" will be treated differently from other
interpretive issues,"S the reviewing courts must pursue a delegation
analysis: did Congress intend the agency's resolution of the "pure
question" at issue to bind the courts?
There probably should be no single rule for all pure question
cases regardless of the statutes and formats involved. Again, the
question should be one of legislative intent, addressed in terms of
relevant evidence and inferences of intent. Even if most "pure
questions" were subjected to independent judicial review, Congress
in some statutes may nevertheless have endowed particular agencies
with interpretive powers meant to be subjected only to limited
review."5' And it can well be imagined that the courts, while
exercising independent review when the agency resolves the pure
question by adjudication, might nonetheless impose only limited
review when the question is resolved in legislative regulations, as to
which the delegatory intent might appear stronger.'52
148. There is no delegation to an agency that lacks policymaking powers. See
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 449 U.S.
268, 278 n.18 (1980) (Stevens, J.); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d
35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976).
149. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. See also the concurring opinion of
Justice Scalia in the United Food case, paraphrased supra in text accompanying notes 77-
78, arguing that the Court there gave only limited "reasonableness" review to the NLRB's
determination of a pure question.
152. Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)(pure question resolved
in adjudicatory decision) with Chevron U.SA Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)(pure
question resolved in legislative regulations).
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3. The Key Inquiry: Is the Interpretation in This Form Binding?
The delegation implied from a statutory gap authorizes binding
interpretive action with respect to the subject matter, as just
described, but not with respect to the format in which the inter-
pretation is set forth. Even when possessed of the subject matter
delegation created by such a gap, the agency cannot express its
interpretation in any format it pleases and expect to command the
courts' acceptance. To act with such binding effect, it must enjoy a
separate delegation of power to pronounce interpretations with the
force of law in the format it uses.
To hold otherwise would sacrifice any chance to assure that the
interpretation is one that Congress deems worthy of binding effect
in the courts. If an agency head has filled a gap with an opinion
expressed in a letter or in a speech or in an amendment to the
manuals, for example, should not the reviewing court at least ask
whether Congress wants it to be bound by that kind of pronounce-
ment? If such informal gap-fillers must always be presumed binding,
subject only to reasonableness review, they would have as much
force as legislative regulations do. An agency would then have little
need for regulations, or for the statutory delegations and public
procedures that safeguard them."
Morton v. Ruiz,'" whose widely-noted "gap-filling" passage'55 was
quoted in Chevron's key paragraph,' is illustrative. Plaintiffs, who
had left their Indian reservation to live in an Indian community
nearby, were denied general assistance benefits because of a pro-
vision in the Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual limiting eligibility to
Indians living "on reservations." In the light of appropriations
provisions and other legislative history, the Court construed the
statutory words "on reservations" to mean "on or near reserva-
tions." 57 But, in view of the insufficiency of appropriated funds to
cover all of those near as well as on reservations, the Court declared
that it was incumbent upon the agency to develop an eligibility
standard which, if rational and proper, might leave some of the class
without benefits. 8 In an analysis parallel to a Chevron Step 2
153. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); 5 U.S.C. § 553;
2 K. Davis, ADMINISTRATlV LAW TR.EATISE 54-60 (2d ed. 1979).
154. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
155. Id. at 231.
156. See supra text accompanying note 61.
157. Morton, 415 U.S. at 230.
158. Id. at 230-31.
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determination of reasonableness, the Court assumed arguendo that
the agency could rationally limit eligibility to those living directly on
the reservations. But it held that this had not been validly accom-
plished by the Manual. Expressly noting that the agency had "long
been empowered to promulgate rules and policies," 59 the Court held
that "the determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc
basis," 6° and that the longstanding provisions of the Manual did not
cure the failure to establish the standard by a legislative rule
published in the Federal Register:
The only official manifestation of this alleged policy of
restricting general assistance to those directly on the reserva-
tions is the material in the Manual which, by BI's own
admission, is solely an internal operations brochure intended
to cover policies that "do not relate to the public." Indeed, at
oral argument the Government conceded that for this to be a
"real legislative rule," itself endowed with the force of law, it
should be published in the Federal Register.'61
The agency did interpret the statute to fill the subject-matter gap, in
a way the Court was willing to assume was substantively reasonable.
But the format it chose was insufficient. Although it possessed
delegated rulemaking authority, the agency chose to establish its
standard only in the Manual, through which it had no delegated
power to speak with the force of law.
Similarly in Chevron, once the Court determined that the issue
about the bubble lay within a gap in congressional intent,'62 the
controlling question became one of whether such an interpretation
issued as a legislative regulation should be binding. The Court an-
swered affirmatively. Congress did not have substantive intent about
the bubble as such, but it had an interpretive intent about the force
to be given EPA's gap-filling interpretations set forth in legislative
regulations.
The delegation as to format must be tested, as always, by
assessing interpretive intent: Did Congress intend that interpretations
159. Id. at 231.
160. Id. at 232.
161. Id. at 234-35.
162. Professor Strauss usefully refers to such issues as falling within a "zone of
indeterminacy." Strauss, supra note 65, at 1125 (1987).
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issued in this format be binding?ss The answer often will be readily
found.'6 In other situations, Congress's interpretive intent respect-
ing the agency's format will have to be derived by inference or
construction. Again, in many instances, this should not be difficult. I"
Consider the adjudications in which the NLRB applies the National
Labor Relations Act to specific labor-management situations. Can
there be any doubt that Congress expects the resulting inter-
pretations, if reasonable and consistent with the Act, to bind the
courts? That conclusion can be confidently drawn from inferences
about Congress having in mind such things as the large numbers of
these cases, the relative level of detail involved, the potential waste
of requiring reinterpretation by the courts," and the lodgement of
direct review in the courts of appeals rather than the district
courts-not to mention the antiquity of the Hearst case so holding.167
By contrast, consider an NLRB interpretation set forth only in a
press release, or in testimony presented to a congressional commit-
tee. The delegation inquiry is particularly critical in such a case. Can
it be thought that Congress would wish interpretations so expressed
to bind the courts? One would have to canvass the specific cir-
cumstances of the National Labor Relations Act and its amendments,
but it is very doubtful that an intent to delegate authority to
interpret in that format would be found. And it seems doubtful that
such an intent would be inferred or presumed, since the format is
not one ordinarily used for pronouncements intended to carry the
force of law.
163. To repeat, the usage of the terms "bind" and "binding" here includes the
understanding that the interpretation is subject only to limited review, for reasonableness
and consistency with the statute.
164. It will be self-evident, for example, whenever legislative rules pursuant to an
"express delegation", see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, are involved. And for certain formats
there may occasionally exist express statutory language enabling a court to conclude that
Congress specifically intended agency interpretations so issued to be binding. A vivid
example is Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 567-68 (1980) (statutory
provision of a defense for reliance upon agency and staff interpretations "signals an
unmistakable congressional decision to treat administrative rulemaking and interpretation
under TILA as authoritative").
165. "[I~f Congress is silent, courts may still infer from the particular statutory
circumstances an impipi congressional instruction about the degree of respect or deference
they owe the agency on a question of law. See Chevron .... They might do so by asking
what a sensible legislator would have expected given the statutory circumstances." Maybury
v. Secretary of HHS, 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.) "Factors" bearing
upon delegation of interpretive authority can be relevant. See generally Note, supra note 52.
166. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R., 235 U.S. 314, 320-21 (1914).
167. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text; NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221, 236-37 (1963).
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How does the "force of law" of a format bear upon the delega-
tion inquiry? It would be circular to say that the needed delegation
can be found whenever the format carries the force of law, since
force of law is simply the result of the delegation. An interpretation
will have the force of law when the agency has exercised delegated
power, as to both subject matter and format, reflecting congressional
intent that such an interpretation is to bind. "Force of law" as used
here merely connotes the binding effect given the kinds of agency
interpretations that Congress through its delegations intends to bind
the courts. ' And that binding effect (force of law) means simply
that the courts may not subject the interpretations to independent
judicial review, but rather must accept them subject only to limited
review for reasonableness and consistency with the statute.' Thus,
an interpretation carrying the force of law gets only limited review
because by definition it is covered by delegation that contemplates
only limited review.
Chevron's own language suggests that "implicit" delegation should
be inferred only for formats that usually carry the force of law. For
Step 2A, the express delegation it spoke of conferred power "to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation"' 0-that is,
to act with the force of law. By direct analogy, a similarly potent
delegation should be required in Step 2B: The reviewing court
should not be bound unless it can find that the implicitly delegated
power authorizes issuance of interpretations possessing the force of
law in the format used.1 71
Concededly, in practice the delegation inquiry will be easily and
affirmatively answered in the large majority of cases.' 7 But although
this inquiry may become a routine one, the reviewing court should
not accept an agency interpretation under Step 2B unless it first
168. See 2 K. Davis, supra note 153, §27:9, at 53-54. Force of law, of course, also
connotes binding effect upon the public and upon the agency itself. See supra note 6.
169. See Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
170. 467 U.S. at 843.
171. Both cases in Chern's supporting footnote, 467 U.S. at 844 n.13, involved
dispositive adjudicative actions supported by dear congressional authority. See INS v. Jong
Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (Board of Immigration Appeals's denial of motion to
reopen deportation proceeding on basis of its interpretation of statutory "extreme hardship"
standard); Train v. National Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975) (EPA's
approval of state implementation plan on basis of its interpretation of provision concerning
"revision" of such plans).
172. The finality, exhaustion, and ripeness rules will block judicial review of many
agency interpretations expressed in formats of less dignity than completed adjudications or
regulations. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISFRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
180-206 (1985) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS].
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seeks and affirmatively finds an appropriate delegation. When the
delegation question is answered negatively-as for example where
the format expressing the agency interpretation is too informal-the
court should not go forward to the reasonableness stage of Step 2.
As a matter of practical judicial psychology, it may often make
little operational difference whether an interpretation is reviewed
independently but given Skidmore consideration or is reviewed for
reasonableness under Chevron Step 2. But the conceptual difference
is large. An interpretation subject to the limited review of Chevron's
Step 2 binds the court-and therefore is law-unless it can be found
unreasonable. The agency thus makes law. But "no agency has the
power to legislate unless Congress has delegated legislative power to
it.""' A delegation, express or implied, must be the foundation for
any interpretation that can bind the courts in this fashion. "The
principle is nothing less than the principle that distinguishes
democratic government from dictatorship."'74
4. A Suitable Standard for Review
How, then, should the reviewing court act upon a case in which
it has concluded (in Step 1) that the agency interpretation is not
contrary to statute but (at the threshold of Step 2) that because of
inadequate delegation it does not possess the force of law?
As a general rule, the court should undertake an independent
review of the statute, extending to the agency's view such special
consideration as it finds helpful.'75 This approach should be observed
in all cases where the nature of the litigation obliges the court to
arrive at a definitive interpretation in order to resolve the case.
Thus, reviewing courts should refrain from extending Chevron
acceptance to informal agency interpretations in settings such as
judicial enforcement proceedings,'78 private litigation,' review of
173. 2 K. DAviS, supra note 153 §27:9, at 54. "The legislative power of the United
States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by
governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the
Congress and subject to the limitations which that body imposes." Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979).
174. 2 K. DAvis, supra note 153, § 27:9, at 55.
175. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. This approach is well illustrated
by Malloy v. Eichler, 628 F. Supp. 582, 592-98 (D.Del. 1986), affid, 860 F.2d 1179 (3rd Cir.
1988).
176. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 872 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1989); D & W
Food Centers, Inc. v. Block, 786 F.2d 751, 758 (6th Cir. 1986).
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agency actions that rest upon interpretations not having the force of
law,"'78 review of the actions of agencies that exercise no policymak-
ing powers and are therefore unequipped to interpret with the force
of law,'79 and challenges to state actions that implicate federal agency
interpretations of federal statutes.' Since the agency's views cannot
bind it in such cases, the court must arrive at its interpretation
independently, subject only to Skidmore consideration.'
An exception to this rule should apply where an agency, though
possessing authority to interpret with the force of law, has to date
expressed its interpretation only informally.8 " If that informal
interpretation becomes the subject of direct review before the agency
has taken concrete action based upon it, a different judicial response
is appropriate. The nonbinding aspect of the informal interpretation
should not entitle the court to tell the agency what definitive view
to adopt. The agency should remain untrammeled in its freedom
177. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 109 S.Ct. 2156, 2161-64 (1989); Patel v. Quality
Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 703 (l1th Cir. 1988); Dove v. Coupe, 759 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
178. See, e.g., Conley v. Brewer, 652 F. Supp. 106 (W.D.Wis. 1986); White v. Bowen,
636 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
179. See, e.g., Sanders v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbldg. Co., 841 F.2d 1085, 1087
(lth Cir. 1988); William Bros., Inc. v. Pate, 833 F.2d 261, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1987).
180. See, e.g., Hicks v. Cantrell, 803 F.2d 789, 791 (4th Cir. 1986); Leigl v. Webb,
802 F.2d 623, 625-27 (2nd Cir. 1986) (rejecting interpretation set forth in manual but
accepting interpretation set forth in notice of proposed rulemaking); Reed v. Blinzinger, 639
F. Supp. 130, 132 (S.D.Ind. 1986)
181. After Chevron, may a reviewing court adopt the posture that, as a matter of
judicial comity toward the executive, it will accept any reasonable agency interpretation even
if informally expressed? Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), is the
salient pre-Chevron case in which the court accepted an informally-expressed agency
interpretation. Justice Brennan's opinion seems to hold that Congress had expressly
delegated to the Federal Reserve staff the authority to issue binding interpretations, which
the courts therefore must accept if reasonable. See 444 U.S. at 566-68; supra notes 9, 164.
But the Court might also be understood as. having chosen in the circumstances to accord
comity to the expert agency, by accepting its interpretations even where they were
informally expressed. On this view, a delegation would not be essential where the court
chose to accept the informal interpretation rather than to interpret independently. If this
is a sound understanding of at least an alternative holding in Milhollin, it arguably survives
Chevron, which, despite its insistence on delegation before the court must accept the agency
view, said nothing expressly to preclude the option of accepting an informal interpretation
where there is no delegation. See supra text of Chevron quoted at note 61; text accompany-
ing notes 98-100, 133-61. But the option should not survive. By accepting an agency
interpretation, a court necessarily holds that that interpretation binds the public. In our
system of government, an agency should bind the public (as well as the courts) only where
Congress by delegation has authorized it to do so. Without the requisite delegation, the
court should go no further than to extend Skidmore consideration. The dispositive act of
interpretation should be the court's.
182. I am indebted to Peter Strauss for sharing his insights on this aspect of the
informal formats problem.
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to choose a position anywhere within the zone of indeterminacy.'
The reviewing court therefore should decide only whether the
informally expressed interpretation is invalid on its face, and should
reserve its detailed scrutiny for later agency actions that enforce or
otherwise execute the interpretation. Meanwhile, the court's deter-
mination not to strike down the informal interpretation would not
invest that interpretation with the force of law, and would not itself
have the same force as would a full judicial interpretation of the
statute. In this situation, the agency does not bind the court, and
the court does not bind the agency.
IV. Which Interpretive Formats Should Bind?
Which interpretations, then, should be recognized as carrying the
force of law,' and as therefore binding on the courts and the
public?8 ' The answer is simple: only those that Congress intended
to have the force of law. As explained,88 the key question in each
case is whether Congress delegated the authority to issue interpreta-
tions with the force of law in this format.
But, in the name of Chevron, courts have occasionally thought
themselves obliged to accept agency interpretations set forth in
informal formats, as to which it is exceedingly unlikely that the
needed delegations could be found or inferred. The opinions either
ignored the delegation inquiry entirely, or assumed that a statutory
gap187 created a delegation sufficient to authorize the format as well
as the precise substantive topic of the interpretation.
Thus, courts have accorded Chevron acceptance to interpretations
set forth in an affidavit as to prior practice,'88 in manuals and
guidelines, 8' in memoranda and informational bulletins, 9 in opinion
183. See supra note 162 and text accompanying notes 109-14.
184. See text accompanying supra notes 168-69.
185. See supra note 6.
186. See text accompanying supra notes 162-77.
187. See text accompanying supra notes 134-40.
188. Mattox v. FrC, 752 F.2d 116, 119 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985).
189. Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Department of Interior's Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Manual relied on to set aside
inconsistent decision made in name of Secretary of Interior); White v. Bowen, 636 F. Supp.
1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Program Operations Manual System relied on, treated as
interpretive rules exempt from notice-and-comment requirements of 5 U.S.C. §553). See
also Nevada ex rel. Loux v. Herrington, 777 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal general
guidelines).
190. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1987); Cook Inlet Native Ass'n v.
Bowen, 810 F.2d 1471, 1474, 1476 (9th Cir. 1987).
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letters, 9 ' in proposed regulations not yet adopted,' in explanatory
comments accompanying publication of regulations,' in policy
statements,'" in interpretive regulation, 195 and in interpretations
developed for purposes of the litigation itself.'6
On the other hand, courts have recognized that an interpretation
lacks power to command Chevron acceptance if it has been expressed
only in an informal format-such as in interpretive rules and policy
statements, 97 in letters and circulars,'" in manuals,'9 or in argument
during litigationS---though it may merit respectful consideration as
appropriate under the Skidmore doctrine."°'
As has been recited, the key inquiry in each case should be the
delegation inquiry: whether Congress intended an interpretation in
191. Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co., 762 F.2d 1275, 1281-82 (5th Cir. 1985);
Techworld Dev. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1986).
192. Liegl v. Webb, 802 F.2d 623, 627 (2d Cir. 1986). See also Watkins v. Blinzinger,
789 F.2d 474, 475 n.2 (7th Cir. 1986).
193. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1987); Kean v. Heckler, 799 F.2d 895,
902 (3d Cir. 1986). See also Chapman v. U.S. Dep't of HHS, 821 F.2d 523, 526-27 (10th
Cir. 1987).
194. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 778 F.2d 850, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("Interpretation and Guidance").
195. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs. v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 397-98 (7th
Cir. 1986); Prater v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 954-55 (7th Cir. 1986); American
Medical Ass'n v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 1422, 1441 (S.D. Ind. 1985). See also Montana v.
Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Steps 2A and 2B under Chevron roughly parallel
legislative and interpretive rules respectively); Griffon v. U.S. Dep't of HHS, 802 F.2d 146,
148 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986).
196. FTC v. Evans Products Co., 775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985); Todd v. Norman,
840 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS. 792 F.2d 153,
165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (concurring opinion); Wayside Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of HHS,
663 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
197. Vietnam Veterans v. Secretary of Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
National Latino Media Coalition v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also
Samaritan Health Serv. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1524, 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Brock v. Louvers
& Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255, 1257-58 (6th Cir. 1987); Griffon v. U.S. Dep't of HHS,
802 F.2d 146, 148 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986).
198. Reed v. Blinzinger, 639 F. Supp. 130, 132 (S.D. Ind. 1986); Malloy v. Eichler,
628 F. Supp. 582, 593 (D. Del. 1986) (distinguishing HCFA interpretive letter from
legislative regulations in Chevron and other limited review cases), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1179 (3d
Cir. 1988); Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (D. R.I. 1985).
199. See Leigl v. Webb, 802 F.2d 623, 625-26 (2nd Cir. 1986). See also National
Medical Center. v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1988).
200. Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. --, 108 S.Ct. 2087, 2092 n. 9 (1988);
Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 1988); William Bros., Inc. v. Pate, 833 F.2d
261. 265 (11th Cir. 1987); Brock on behalf of Williams v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134,
1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
201. See, e.g., Brock v. Louvers & Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255, 1258 (6th Cir. 1987);
Dove v. Coupe, 759 F.2d 167, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Malloy v. Eichler, 628 F. Supp. 582,
592 (D.Del. 1986); and Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (D. R.I. 1985).
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this format to have the force of law."0 ' Where Congress's delegatory
intent can be discerned it should, of course, govern.
For the critical situation in which Congress has not indicated its
delegatory intent, the court cannot simply assume that a "gap" in
the substantive meaning of a statute automatically establishes a
delegation whereunder any reasonable agency interpretation will
bind the courts. 03 This approach wrongly throws the armor of
limited review around all interpretations, regardless of the formats
in which they are expressed. A more principled and discriminating
approach is needed.
Some interpretive formats will consistently possess the force of law
because the delegations respecting those formats consistently convey
that binding force. Similarly, other formats will consistently be found
to lack such force because such delegations are absent. These
patterns can furnish the source for presumptions about the delega-
tory intent of Congress, to be applied where no specific basis exists
to find or construct that intent. This approach will form part of the
analysis that follows. It does not aim for fixed rules to govern the
formats, because a variant Congressional intent in a particular case
may call for a variant result. The aim, though, is to fashion a
coherent and workable method of applying Chevron, recognizing that
the binding effect of an interpretation depends in principal part on
its format.
A. Legislative Rules
Interpretations are often expressed through the exercise of the
agency's statutorily-delegated authority to make law in the form of
rules.2" Interpretations set forth in this format possess the fullest
credentials to command judicial acceptance. They are reviewed
under Step 2A, and are "given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute." 05
202. See supra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
204. The technical term of the APA is "rules," 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4),(5), 553, but this
paper often uses the common term "regulations," to signify those "rules" that are called
"regulations," as in the Code of Federal Regulations. Ordinarily, a policy statement or
opinion letter would not be called a "regulation," though it might be a "rule" within the
APA. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
205. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. See also Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9,
426 (1977).
By embodying statutory interpretations, legislative rules do not become "interpretative
rules," 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A), (d)(2), which carry less force and can be promulgated more
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The question may arise whether the "express delegation""
requisite for Step 2A treatment must be a delegation specific to the
portion of the statute at issue. The answer must be "no"; interpreta-
tions authorized under general conferrals of rulemaking authority
should qualify as well. The regulation involved in Chevron was itself
authorized under a general delegation.2" It is true that such general
authorizations have sometimes been construed to confer only
housekeeping or other limited powers, so that any substantive
expressions under them would be treated as interpretive rather than
legislative regulations.10i But the more general tendency seems to
accord legislative effect to rules issued under such general authoriza-
tions.1 9 Obviously, their effect depends upon the delegatory intent
of Congress in each case. But in those situations where the courts
find that such general provisions do authorize legislative rulemaking,
regulations under them should have force equal to those promul-
gated under specific grants. 210 Chevron has eliminated degrees of
informally. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 153, § 7:12, at 57. "When Congress delegates
authority to make rules, the reviewing court lacks power to determine the content of the
rules, even if the rules are an interpretation of the statute." 5 K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE 279 (2d ed. 1984).
And of course not all legislative rules involve interpretations of statutes. Many simply
legislate policy, as did the rules reviewed in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); these rules are subject to a somewhat different standard
of judicial review. Id, see Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.
L. REv. 363 (1986); In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L.
REv. 329, 339 (1979). But see Pierce. supra note 114.
206. 467 U.S. at 843.
207. See 46 Fed. Reg. 50766 (Oct. 14, 1981), relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a) ("The
Administrator is authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his
functions under this Chapter").
208. See e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S, 16, 24 (1981) (quoting
Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1982)) (for a regulation relying
only on general authority to "prescribe all needful rules," 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), "we owe the
interpretation less deference than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority to
define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision"); Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 (1979).
209. See Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DuK, L. J.
381, 395 n.69 and accompanying text. See also Mourning v. Family Publications Service,
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973): "Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply
that the agency may 'make ... such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act,' we have held that the validity of a regulation promulgated
thereunder will be sustained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation.'"; See also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979); National
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973); National Nutritional Foods
Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 827 (1975); K. DAVIS,
supr= note 153, § 7:8 at 175 (Supp. 1982).
210. See, e.g., National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.
1988)(applying Step 2A review to a regulation apparently authorized only under 47 U.S.C.
I 303(r)).
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deference, except to the extent any exists between Step 2A and
2B;2"' it would seem profitless to recognize them as between two
classes of concededly authorized legislative rules."'
It is manifestly too late in the day to suggest that Chevron
acceptance should apply only to interpretations embodied in
legislative rules, although, interestingly, it is perfectly possible to
read the opinion that way."1 ' More expressive of Chevron's overall
tone, and of its key language stressing delegation, is the analysis put
forward here: that Chevron acceptance extends to all interpretations
expressed in formats that Congress intended to be used to imple-
ment delegated law-making authority. We now turn to some of those
formats.
For these formats, as always, the delegation must be sought.
Where none is found or inferred, none should be presumed in any
case unless, at a minimum, the agency has expressed its interpreta-
tion with finality and some formality, in a dispositive action-an
action that specifies immediate legal results or that definitively
ordains results for the future. The informal, or tentative,2 1 4 or
advisory, or internal, or unpublicized interpretive expression will not
ordinarily be a tool that Congress intends to implement its delega-
tion of law-making authority. Additionally, an interpretation put
forth in such a format ordinarily will not have been arrived at
through a process that encompassed public or adversarial participa-
tion. Although the agency cannot bind the reviewing court by such
an interpretation, its expertise is not lost to the court, which accords
the interpretation the special consideration called for by Skidmore.
211. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
212. See Diver, supra note 3, at 594 ("A broad rulemaking power is no less an
indication of policymaking responsibility than is a narrow one").
213. Indeed, if read literally, this would be its purport. Its central passage speaks
first of an express delegation of authority to elucidate the statute by regulation, and then
of a legislative delegation that is only implicit, but still presumably a delegation of the same
authority "to elucidate . . . the statute by regulation." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Only
legislative rules would be covered in either case. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974),
quoted at the beginning of the paragraph, dealt with delegation of legislative rulemaking
authority. And the whole of the Chevron opinion makes perfect sense if read with the
assumption that the Court was speaking only of deference to legislative rules.
214. See Conecuh-Monroe Community Action Agency v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 581, 586-
87 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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B. Agency Adjudications
The concept of adjudication used here is that of the APA." 5
Generally, it refers to a final disposition of a specific matter directed
to an individual or to a dosed identifiable class. It includes formal
trial-type proceedings, like those by which are determined such
matters as denials or revocations of transportation and utility and
securities licenses, eligibility for federal disability benefits, and
violations of trade, election, labor and occupational safety laws.216 It
also includes less formal agency actions, often of a bureaucratic
rather than a forensic nature, passing upon grants, reimbursements,
state implementation plans, international trade matters, some sorts
of welfare-type benefits, many environmental, health and safety
matters, and numerous others. Often matters that are initially passed
upon at a staff level can be carried into hearing proceedings, which
sometimes are of a trial type and sometimes are not.
The mere possession of adjudicatory powers is not in itself
sufficient to establish a delegation to interpret authoritatively, even
within the agency's usual routine. A purely adjudicative agency,
holding no rulemaking or other policymaking powers, "is not
entitled to any special deference from the courts" for its interpreta-
tions.217 But the adjudicatory interpretation of an agency with
215. 5 U.s.c §§ 551(6), (7).
216. See listings of agencies and of the formal proceedings they administer in Office
of the Chairman, Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Federal Administrative Law Judge Hearings,
Statistical Report for 1976-1978 (1980) (by Jeffrey Lubbers).
217. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
449 U.S. 268, 278 n.18 (1980)(Stevens, J.). This is "axiomatic." United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Schuylkill Metals Corp., 828 F.2d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 1987) (Occu. Safety & Health
Regulatory Comm'n). See also William Bros., Inc. v. Pate, 833 F.2d 261, 264 (11th Cir.
1987) (Benefits Review Bd. of Dep't of Labor); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura,
544 F.2d 35, 49 (2nd Cir. 1976) (Benefits Review Bd. is "entirely an umpiring agency")
(Friendly, J.).
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policymaking powers, like that of the NLRB in Hearst,"8 is capable
of binding the courts under Chevron."'
In inquiring whether an agency possesses delegated authority to
act with the force of law through adjudicatory proceedings, a useful
touchstone is the idea of "the usual administrative routine" of the
agency.""0 Did Congress contemplate not only that the agency will act
in the prescribed adjudicative fashion, but also that it should have
the primary power to resolve the interpretive issues it thus en-
counters?" '
1. Mixed Questions
For "mixed" questions of interpretation, where statutory terms are
applied to detailed and specific facts, Hearst and the innumerable
cases following it establish the existence of a delegation that places
those interpretive questions in the usual administrative routine.2 It
is conceded on all hands that such mixed interpretive rulings are
entitled to acceptance under Chevron,2. and there seems no imagin-
able reason that Chevron acceptance should differ in any practical
way from Hearst acceptance. Thus, on direct judicial review of the
agency's mixed-question decision, its interpretation/application must
be accepted by the court if it is reasonable.22 4
218. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 322 U.S. I1l (1944).
219. See, e.g., DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568 (1988)(unfair labor practice); New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(denying petitions fbr review under Clean Air Act); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of
Governors Fed. Reserve Sys, 847 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (approving of bank
underwriting commercial paper); Common Cause v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 842 F.2d 436
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (determining not to take enforcement action); Alaska v. Lyng, 797 F.2d
1479, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986) (selecting of grant lands from national forest); Population Inst.
v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (grant of funds by Agency for Int'l
Development); Humane Soc'y. of U.S. v. EPA. 790 F.2d 106, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(permitting experimental use of pesticide); Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 749 F.2d 89,
96 n.3 (1st Cir. 1984).
220. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (quoting Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941)). See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
221. See Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 749 F.2d 89, 96 (1st Cir. 1984)(inter-
pretation was the kind of matter "Congress would have intended... to be given significant
weight").
222. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
223. Even those who have suggested that pure questions of interpretation get no
deference stress the binding effect of mixed interpretations. E.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987); International Union, UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 765 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
224. See supra note 219. See also Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063
(7th Cir. 1988).
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But must the mixed-question interpretation be similarly honored
when it is drawn into litigation collaterally, as in review of other
agency actions or in proceedings to which the agency is not party?
This probably should depend upon what resolution is given the
controversy about whether "pure questions of interpretation" may be
accorded Chevron acceptance.25 In a mixed-question determination,
the statutory interpretation is embedded in and dependent upon
detailed facts, as was the NLRB's determination in Hearst that the
newsboys were "employees" within the Act. If a court can derive
from it a conclusion of sufficient generality to be applied elsewhere,
that proposition perforce has been unsprung from the facts in which
it was enmeshed, and becomes an abstraction or generality in the
nature of a pure question (in Hearst, for example, whether a person
can be an "employee" without being on the employer's payroll). It
would seem, at the same time, to have escaped the delegation that
gave authority to the mixed interpretation as a part of the admin-
istrative routine.
Whether a delegation exists sufficient to bind the courts on a
pure question would, of course, be a matter for inquiry in each
case.226 That inquiry would be powerfully influenced by evidence that
the Supreme Court had become hospitable to Chevron acceptance for
pure-question interpretations, or per contra, that it had declared that
class of interpretations ineligible for such acceptance.
2. Pure Questions
The same analysis, of course, would govern both direct and
collateral review of pure-question interpretations announced in
adjudications. Perhaps in any event minor issues could be eligible for
Chevron acceptance as part of the administrative routine con-
templated by delegation, even if they were abstract and general and
therefore "pure."'2 1 The tone of Chevron pervasively suggests as
much, and that suggestion does not seem disturbed by the later
opinions questioning Chevron's applicability to pure issues.2 8 And if
225. See supra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
227. Arguably, the issue resolved by the agency in Chevron (through rulemaking) fits
this description.
228. See supra note 78. The courts in numerous cases have accepted, under Chevron,
agency adjudicative interpretations on apparently pure questions: E.g., Clark-Cowlitz JL.
Oper. Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Georgetown Steel Corp. v. U.S.,
801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Kean v. Heckler, 799 F.2d 895 (3rd Cir. 1986); Alaska v.
Lyng, 797 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1986); Wyckoff v. EPA, 796 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1986);
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we are to realize Chevron's benefits of national uniformity,29 at least
some dasses of pure-question interpretations must be deemed
acceptable. Otherwise, a nationwide wilderness of specific instances
would result.
On the other hand, even if the binding force of pure-question
interpretations were affirmed by the Supreme Court, issues would
remain for which the essential delegation would not be found. An
example may be the issue in the Highland Park case"' as to whether
the CIO had to file a noncommunist affidavit, which Congress
probably did not entrust to the NLRB because of its large import or
because the Board lacked expertise in national security legislation."'
In other words, there are doubtless some issues that Congress would
want the generalist courts to resolve independently, without being
controlled by particular agency perspectives.
To warrant acceptance, a pure-question interpretation should be
pivotal to the agency's adjudicative decision. Disembodied proposi-
tions spoken obiter in adjudicative opinions should have no weight in
the courts.3 '
3. Reasoned Decisions
It seems plain that agency interpretations, like other agency
actions, must be the product of reasoned decisionmaking in order
to be deemed sufficiently, reasonable to command Chevron accept-
ance. 2' If the decision announces a change in the agency's interpre-
tive views, a reasoned analysis is especially vital. The agency in effect
Railway Labor Exec. Assn. v. United States, 791 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1986); Ohio v.
Ruckelshaus, 776 F.2d 1333 (6th Cir. 1985); Mattox v. FTC, 752 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1985);
Al Tech Specialty Steel v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1421 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986); Bayonne
School Bd. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 640 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1986).
229. See Strauss, supra note 65, at 1121-24, 1129-33 (1981).
230. Cited and discussed supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
231. One may also wonder whether the courts would consider that resolution of the
interpretive issues had been delegated to the agencies in, for example, NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 267 (1974);
or Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
232. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
233. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42-43, 57 (1983); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
v. FERC, 850 F.2d 769, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v.
FEC, 831 F.2d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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is bound by its interpretation until it acts in a reasoned way to
depart from it.21M
Thus, either the adjudicatory decision itself or the document
upon which it relies should explain the agency's reasoning. Where
it applies an adequately-reasoned legislative rule"3 5 or prior adju-
dicatory decision,- the new adjudicatory interpretation incorporates
that reasoning even if it tenders none of its own. A rather different
analysis obtains where reliance is placed upon a lesser instrument
-such as a manual or a policy statement2ff-that would not itself
command Chevron acceptance. It is the nature of such a document
that, in a later adjudicatory proceeding, the agency is neither bound
to follow it nor entitled to treat others as bound by it; the agency
must at that time entertain challenges to the interpretation previous-
ly expressed, and decide whether to adopt it."'8 However, if the
agency then consciously chooses the prior interpretation and ratifies
the reasoning there expressed, its decision should bind, at least on
direct review. The agency's adjudicative action within its usual
administrative routine will give force of law to the interpretation
expressed in the earlier action, whose reasoning in turn can support
the otherwise-unexplained adjudicatory application.2 9 But if the
earlier informal interpretation is just mechanically applied, a court
should have no obligation to accept it.
4. Lower-Level Decisions
Clearly, the reasoned adjudicatory interpretations of agency heads
and their immediate delegates should qualify for the judicial
234. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 109 S.Ct. 468, 476 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe principles announced in an adjudication cannot be departed from in
future adjudications without reason"); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC, 850 F.2d
769, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
235. See. e.g., Aliceville Hydro Assocs. v. FERC, 800 F.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir, 1986);
Capitol Technical Services v. FAA, 791 F.2d 964, 970-71 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
236. See, e.g. United Retail Workers Union Local 881 v. NLRB, 774 F.2d 752, 762-
63 (7th Cir. 1985).
237. See, e.g., Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343, 1349-
51 (10th Cir. 1987) ,manual); Regular Common Carrier Conf. v. United States, 803 F.2d
1186, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (policy statement).
238. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), discussed supra note 137 and supra text accompanying notes
154-61.
239. See N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v, Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 850 (D.D.C. 1986).
Only that portion of the earlier document that was determinative of the adjudicatory
outcome should be treated as binding.
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acceptance called for by Chevron. But should the interpretive
decisions of lower-level officials so qualify? The few cases found are
unhelpful.24 Again, the question should be one of delegation: would
Congress intend the low-level decision to bind?"' The matter may
turn also upon the completeness with which the agency heads
themselves may have delegated their powers to the decision maker,
and upon whether all levels of appeal within the agency were
exhausted.'" In most cases prudence would probably dictate that
Chevron acceptance be extended, if at all, only on direct review and
not in collateral proceedings. Of course Skidmore consideration would
be appropriate.
C. Procedural Rules and Actions
An interesting group of cases has applied Chevron's Step 2 to
uphold interpretations expressed in agencies' procedural rules and
in other determinations of how they will proceed in the exercise of
their powers.
The binding effect of procedural regulations issued pursuant to
statutory authority is clear enough,"° and the courts uphold these if
they are reasonable and consistent with statute, citing Chevron where
there is a statutory procedural scheme to interpret. '
240. See Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(lower level official's
interpretation of agency's regulations denied Chevron acceptance, partly because official was
not head of agency); Gatson v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 442, 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1988)(SSA
Administrative Law Judge's interpretation treated as that of SSA. but was rejected as
incorrect, with no citation of Chevron); U.S. v. Lockheed, 817 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir.
1987)(Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals' Interpretation is "freely reviewable" under
review statute, 41 U.S.C. § 609); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 437 (D.C. Cir.
1986)("no reason why the letter from the head of the EPA's Pesticide Division .. .would
not be entitled to deference"); Aliceville Hydro Assoc. v. FERC, 800 F.2d 1147, 1152 (D.C.
Cir. 1986)("informal practice among relatively low-level staff members" allowing exceptions
to rule did not undercut Chevron acceptance of rule). See also AFGE v. FLRA, 840 F.2d
947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
241. One pre-Chevron instance where Congress had such an intention is Ford Motor
Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1980). See also 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(3), providing that
FCC bureau actions, if not reviewed by the full Commission, "have the same force and
effect" as actions of the Commission.
242. See Kixminer v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
243. See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 467-70 (1900); Service v. Dulles. 354 U.S.
363, 372 (1957) ("regulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding
upon him as well as the citizen"); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
244. See, e.g., Committee to Save WEAM v. FCC, 808 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Tillet v. Carlin, 637 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Conn. 1986); Tillett v. Carlin, 637 F. Supp. 245,
250, 253 (D. Conn. 1985).
Interpretive Formats and the Force of Law
By apparent analogy to these cases, a number of decisions have
applied Chevron analysis to interpretations upon which the agencies
rested other sorts of decisions about how they would proceed. In
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society," the Secretary
of Commerce determined that it better served the legislation
implementing the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling to accept Japan's offer of an agreement to phase out its
whaling, rather than to certify Japan's whaling activities to the
President for possible sanctions. Following straightforwardly through
the Chevron steps, Justice White for the majority found that the
statute did not forbid the Secretary's procedure, and that withhold-
ing certification in the circumstances reflected a reasonable construc-
tion of ambiguous statutory language.46 In Young v. Community
Nutrition Institute,47 the Food and Drug Administration chose not to
promulgate a tolerance regulation with respect to a certain car-
cinogenic mold, but instead proceeded by a less formal process to
set an "action level." Justice O'Connor found the statutory language
potentially mandating regulations to be ambiguous, and held the
FD/s interpretation to be sufficiently rational to require judicial
acceptance under Chevron.'4 In United States v. City of Fulton,249
ambiguous statutory language was construed reasonably by the
Secretary of Energy to permit interim increases in the rates charged
by regional power marketing administrations.50 And in Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NRDC,"5I the majority upheld EPA's practice of granting
"fundamentally different factor" variances, pursuant to regulations,
as both reasonable and consistent with the Clean Water Act.'
In all four of these cases, the Court reviewed the statutory
authority for the agencies' actions and, though it did not expressly
speak of "delegation" to interpret in those ways, viewed the statutes
as contemplating such interpretive powers.' Much the same thing
245. 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (5-4).
246. Id. at 2867-68.
247. 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
248. Id. at 2364-65.
249. 475 U.S. 657 (1986).
250. Id. at 666-72.
251. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
252. Id. at 125-26.
253. See Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 241 ("Congress granted the Secretary the
authority to determine whether a foreign nation's whaling in excess of quotas diminishes
the effectiveness of the IWC, and we find no reason to impose a mandatory obligation upon
the Secretary to certify that every quota violation fails that standard."); Young, 476 U.S. at
981-82 ("To interpret Congress's statutory language to give the FDA discretion to decide
whether tolerance levels are necessary to protect the public health is therefore sensible");
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has occurred in several lower court cases.M These cases show a
substantial sense of upholding the agencies' procedural determina-
tions because Congress had given them appropriate authority so to
interpret.
In the same pattern, but stronger, is United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc."' The cases just discussed entailed issues affecting
the procedural powers of the agencies within their respective
substantive spheres. But Riverside Bayview also concerned "a problem
of defining the bounds of [the agency's] regulatory authority,"'256 as
to which, citing Chevron and CMA, Justice White for a unanimous
Court held that "our review is limited to the question whether ...
[the agency's construction] is reasonable." 5 ' On this basis the Corps
of Engineers acted permissibly in redefining the term "waters of the
United States" in the Clean Water Act to enable it to require permits
to discharge fill material into freshwater wetlands. The case seems
to hold that, even when an agency interprets its enabling legislation
to enlarge its jurisdiction, its interpretation will be deemed suitable
to receive Chevron acceptance.5 ' Although the issue is beyond the
scope of this Article, one may wonder whether Chevron will endur-
ingly displace the deeply-rooted doctrine that an "agency may not
finally decide the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial
Fulton, 475 U.S. at 670 ("Congress, in declining to set out a detailed mandatory procedural
scheme, apparently intended to leave the agency substantial discretion"); Chemical Mfrs.,
470 U.S. at 131 ("Since the dispute is therefore reduced to an argument over the means
used by EPA to define subcategories of indirect dischargers in order to achieve the goals
of the Act, [this is] a particularly persuasive case for deference to the Agency's interpreta-
tion").
254. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1988) (determination that
authorized action is discretionary); NRDC v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(withdrawal
of proposed regulations); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959, 969 (9th
Cir. 1986) (determination that power is discretionary). See also Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1989)(agency regulation allocating burden
of proof).
Sometimes agency interpretations of this type are rejected under Chevron Step 1
analysis. See, e.g., Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399 (1988); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States Army Eng'r Center v.
FLRA, 762 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1985); American Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
255. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
256. Id. at 132.
257. Id. at 132.
258. The Court found that "Congress acquiesced" in the administrative construction.
474 U.S. at 138. The key significance given this factor may mitigate any inappropriate-
ness of employing Chevron Step 2 analysis rather than independent interpretation in these
circumstances.
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function." ' Compromising this precept would create the possibility
that autocratic actions must be ratified by the courts. Despite
such concerns, the courts seem disposed to presume that they will
be bound by reasonable interpretations embodied in an agency's
procedural regulations or other dispositive determinations of how it
will carry on its work.
D. Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements
No such presumption should be tolerated for interpretive rules
or policy statements,26 or similar formats. Their precisely relevant
quality is that they lack the force of law-that is, they cannot bind
the courts even if they are consistent with statute and reasonable.2 61
This circumstance is not changed by Chevron:
Thus an interpretative rule does not have the force of law
and is not binding on anyone, including the courts, though the
status conferred on an agency as the delegate of Congress and
by its expertise often leads courts to defer to the agency's
interpretation of its governing statute. See Joseph v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n. 26 (D.C. Cir.
1977)("Legislative rules have the full force of law and are
binding on a court subject only to review under an arbitrary
and capricious standard. Interpretive rules do not have the
force of law and even though courts often defer to an agency's
interpretive rule they are always free to choose otherwise"). 262
259. Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946). See also Hi-Craft Clothing
Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 916 (3d Cir. 1981)("government agencies have a tendency to
swell, not shrink, and are likely to have an expansive view of their mission" and "therefore,
an agency ruling that broadens its own jurisdiction is examined carefully"); Independent
Ins. Agents of Amer. v. Bd. of Gov. Federal Reserve Sys., 838 F.2d 627, 632 (2d Cir.
1988); Morrison, supra note 67, 374-75.
260. For definitions of interpretive rules and policy statements, see Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947); 2 K. DAVS, supra note 153,
§§ 7.5, 7.8, 7.10, 7.12. See aLso Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979);
Board of Educ. of New York v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1979).
261. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1977); Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 724 F.2d 979, 984-
85 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 153, §§ 7.9, 7.13, 7.15; ADMINISTrRATIVE LAW
AND PROCLSS, supra note 172, §§ 6.4.4a, 6.4.4b.
"[A] court is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation. Varying degrees
of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as the
timing and consistency of the agency's position, and the nature of its expertise." Batterton
v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977).
262. National Latino Media Coalition v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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And: "A binding policy is an oxymoron. '
Where the reviewing court has found no delegation of power to
interpret authoritatively in such a format, then, its proper approach
is not that of Chevron Step 2 but rather that of Skidmore."' A useful
model has been presented by Judge Starr who, after pointing out
the "legislative effect" that interpretations have under Chevron where
Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated authority to the
agency, applied the law in this way:
Determining the extent of deference in the case at hand
therefore requires an examination of the authority conferred
by Congress on the Secretary with respect to each regulation
in question ....
We turn first to the Secretary's mandated two-step process
for determining the prevailing wage in a locality.
[.. T]he language of the statute seems best read as granting
the authority to make the prescribed wage determination but
not to define "locality" with near finality shielded by high
deference. Under our approach, the Secretary's regulation
interpreting "locality" as the location of each individual
potential contractor constitutes an interpretive ruling that
carries some weight and attracts some deference, but does not
enjoy the highest degree of deference available under "a-
rbitrary and capricious" review.
An even clearer case of an interpretive ruling is the
Secretary's determination [concerning successor contracts].
There is no language in the statute indicating a delegation to
the Secretary of the authority to make such a determination,
and we therefore accord the Secretary's decision only some
deference and weight!"s
The lower federal courts have occasionally applied Chevron Step
2 to interpretive rules, policy statements and their functional
equivalents. Sometimes a court accepts the interpretation without
263. Vietnam Veterans v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
264. For an alternate standard for pre-enforcement review in some circumstances,
see text accompanying supra notes 182-83.
265. AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 341-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted).
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apparent heed to its format, as was done in Conley v. Brewer" with
respect to an interpretive regulation, and in American Federation of
Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority2 17 where a
policy statement was involved.
Even where they recognize that these formats are somehow less
potent than legislative rules, courts on occasion have felt bound to
accord them Chevron acceptance. In Prater v. United States Parole
Commission,"6 for example, the court said that the agency's guidelines
were "interpretive rather than legislative" but accepted them under
Chevron Step 2.' Chevron acceptance was similarly extended to a
"Dear Doctor letter" (concerning Medicare) from the Secretary of
HHS, which the court treated as an interpretive rule.7 In a case
where the interpretation of the HHS Secretary was set forth in a
Medicaid Action Transmittal, the court said:
The district court was correct in refusing to give the
Secretary's interpretation here "legislative effect"-this case
. . does not involve regulations promulgated upon an express
delegation from Congress, by formal rulemaking. But the
district court was still bound to defer to his interpretation if
reasonable and statutorily permissible. 7'
As discussed above, a practice of routine acceptance for inter-
pretations expressed in these formats would, in abdication of judicial
duties under Marbuy,272 endow them with force of law where
Congress did not intend them to have such force. By this process,
the agency would bind the public without itself being bound by
interpretations in these formats."' And since these formats are
266. 652 F. Supp. 106, 109-10 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (accepting Parole Commission's
interpretive regulation and explanatory statement that "good time" credits expire when
prisoner is released on parole).
267. 778 F.2d 850, 852, 856, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(accepting FLRA "Interpretation and
Guidance" holding that agency head may disapprove contract containing a provision
ordered by Federal Service Impasses Panel but contrary to law).
268. 802 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1986).
269. Id. at 954. The opinion might be read as using the interpretation as an aid to
finding clear intent in Chevron Step 1. but this seems doubtful.
270. American Medical Ass'n v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 1422, 1440-41 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
271. Wisconsin Dep't of Health v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 397 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 1495 (1988). See also Samaritan
Health Servs. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1524, 1529-31 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (manual treated as
interpretive rule rejected as unreasonable).
272. See text accompanying supra notes 142-43.
273. See Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 7: 1, 1990
exempt from APA public participation requirements,274 an especially
odious frustration is visited upon the affected private parties: they
are bound by a proposition they had no opportunity to help shape
and will have no meaningful opportunity to challenge when it is
applied to them. 75
E. Manuals, Guidelines, Staff Instructions, Opinion Letters
The rules that apply to interpretative rules and policy statements
should apply to this category. 2 6  Interpretations presented in these
formats does not have the force of law.277
274. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A), (d)(2) (1988).
275. In a slightly different context, Judge Starr has observed: "Agencies may yield
to temptation and seek to shield their regulations from the scrutiny occasioned by notice-
and-comment procedures, choosing instead to cast would-be regulations as interpretative
rules. The rule would still, of course, be subject to scrutiny in a subsequent proceeding,
but this fact may be of little comfort to prospective commentors, given the deference
accorded agency views in any such proceedings." Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young,
818 F.2d 943, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (concurring and dissenting opinion). The courts would
seldom have occasion to pass upon an agency's failure to consider alternate interpretations
which commentors might have put forward had § 553(c) procedures been followed.
276. Included in this category are manuals, handbooks, guidelines, staff instructions,
opinion letters, explanatory statements, testimony presented to Congress, speeches, releases
and other similar materials. Indeed, interpretations presented in these formats are
sometimes deemed to be "interpretative rules" or. "general statements of policy" and
therefore exempted from the procedural rulemaking requirements of the APA under 5
U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A), (d)(2). E.g., Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948,
954-55 (7th Cir. 1986); White v. Bowen, 636 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
American Medical Ass'n v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 1422, 1440-41 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
277. Thus, the court in Leigi v. Webb, 802 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1986), rejected the
interpretation set forth in an HEW Action Transmittal, incorporated into the agency's
Medical Assistance Manual, stating that "a manual does not comprise regulations ... [but]
[r]ather, a manual contains interpretive guidelines that the court may disregard after due
consideration." Id. at 626. (However, the court accepted an interpretation set forth in a
notice of proposed rulemaking.) Similarly, the Sixth Circuit did not accept a Wage and
Hour Opinion Letter's interpretation, whose authority it deemed to be only "persuasive and
not precedential." Brock v. Louvers & Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255, 1258 (6th Cir. 1987).
In Malloy v. Eichler, 628 F. Supp. 582 (D. Del. 1986), afftd, 860 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1988),
the Secretary of HHS insisted that her views embodied in Health Care financing
Administration Letter 85-10 were "entitled to a legislative effect' that can be overturned
only if she has exceeded her authority or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner." Id.
at 592. But the court stated that "letter 85-10 is not a legislative or substantive regulation
... [but] is more closely akin to the statutory interpretation traditionally left to the courts
than it is to the statutory definition delegated to the Secretary." Id. at 593 (emphasis in
original). Accord, Reed v. Blinzinger, 639 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Ind. 1986). See Schweiker
v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (13-volume SSA Claims Manual "has no legal force").
Of course, an interpretation expressed in one of these informal formats may be based upon
documents carrying the force of law; see e.g., the letter of the Commissioner of Customs,
based on regulations, discussed by Justice Scalia in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 321-22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Nevertheless, courts have sometimes shown a readiness to extend
Chevron's style of acceptance to interpretations expressed in these
informal ways. In Hicks v. Cantrell,27 for example, the Fourth Circuit
gave controlling effect to a letter from a Department of Labor
regional administrator to the Virginia Employment Commissioner,
stating that the Secretary of Labor interpreted the Federal Sup-
plemental Compensation Act as allowing states the option of refusing
to waive overpayments. "Lacking a clear Congressional intent to the
contrary, we must conclude that the Secretary's interpretation is both
reasonable and permissible, although it may be inconsistent with
prior interpretations."27
In White v. Bowen,"'0 the court accepted an HHS Program
Operations Manual System memorandum which, as the court
pointed out, was not published in the Federal Register."'1 The court
in Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co. 2' reached its own interpretation of
the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, but added that it was
"obliged to defer to reasonable interpretation of a statute" as set
forth in a Department of Labor Wage-Hour Administrator's opinion
letter.285
In Cook Inlet Native Association v. Bowen 21 the interpretation
subsisted initially in a memorandum of the Assistant Solicitor for
Indian Affairs, which was adopted through a letter by the Indian
Health Service; the same interpretation also appeared in the
periodical Nature News and B.IA. Bulletin, in the Village Self-Deter-
mination Workbook, and in the Alaska Native Village Self-Deter-
mination Briefing Book, all evidently BIA publications. 8 5 Finding
278. 803 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1986).
279. Id. at 794. In another part of the opinion, the court indicated that the same
result might be required by the plain meaning of the statute. Id. at 792. See also Mead
Corp. v. Tilley, 109 S.Ct. 2156, 2161-64 (1989)(opinion letters and guidelines).
280. 636 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
281. Id. at 1239. See also Friends of Shawangunks v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 450 (2d
Cir. 1985) (DOI Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Manual).
282. 762 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1985).
283. Id. at 1281-82. See also American Medical Ass'n v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 1422
1441-42 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (letter to doctors from HHS secretary accepted under Chevron Step
2); Holcomb v. United Automotive Ass'n of St. Louis, 658 F. Supp. 84, 86 (E.D. Mo. 1987)
(court appeared prepared to accord "considerable deference" to opinion letter, but
concluded it did not support plaintiffs claim). But see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1940).
284. 810 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1987).
285. Id. at 1474.
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that the legislative history showed no contrary intent, the court said
that it "must, therefore, defer to that interpretation. '
Again, the standard for review of interpretations in these formats
should not be the acceptance of Chevron Step 2, but rather an
independent scrutiny that includes the respectful consideration
Skidmore requires."7
E Litigating Positions
Judge Learned Hand has said:
[A] public officer, charged with the enforcement of a law, is
different from one who must decide a dispute. If there is a
fair doubt, his duty is to present the case for the side which
he represents, and leave decision to the court, or the admin-
istrative tribunal, upon which lies the responsibility of decision.
If he surrenders a plausible construction, it will, at least it
may, be surrendered forever; and yet it may be right. Since
such rulings need not have the detachment of a judicial, or
semi-judicial decision, and may properly carry a bias, it would
seem that they should not be as authoritative ..
It is hard to conceive that an interpretation put forward in
argument, without previously having been laid down in a form
bearing the force of law, could bind the court to which it is
presented. An agency may not simply declaim, "this is our inter-
pretation-under Chevron you must accept it," and prevail. It would
exceed the bounds of fair play to allow an institutionally self-
interested advocacy position, which "may properly carry bias," to
control the judicial outcome. Even the cynical should balk at
286. Id. at 1476. See also Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 377-79 (1987) (reference
to Handbook Supplement for Administrative Use, a brief amicus curiae, letters and a
memorandum).
287. "A finding that her views lack legislative effect will not foreclose the issue because
an administrative interpretation is entitled to substantial weight when it satisfies the
conditions enumerated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. . . ." Malloy v. Eichler, 628 F. Supp.
582, 592 (D. Del. 1986), affd, 860 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Dove v. Coupe, 759
F.2d 167, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wage & Hour Release, reprinted in Wage Hour Manual,
given "respectful consideration" and upheld); Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. 290,
297 (1985). For an alternate standard for pre-enforcement review in some circumstances,
see supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
288. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir.) affd
328 U.S. 275 (1946).
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assuming that Congress has delegated such a power to judge one's
own cause.
It is one thing to extend special consideration to the agency view,
even when it is expressed only in a litigation position with no
dispositive rule or adjudicative action to back it up. Skidmore counsels
no less, as part of the court's independent review.8 9 It is quite
something else for a court to deem itself bound by such an inter-
pretation. Despite words of caution, 290 courts occasionally have shown
some disposition to do the latter, citing Chevron.19' Those courts may
have confused their obligations under Chevron with those under
Skidmore. Independent deliberation of the interpretive issue, joined
with special consideration of the agency's views, is the proper judicialposture.""
289. See text at supra notes 47-52.
290. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Calif. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 162 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1986)(en banc)(Scalia, J.) ("There is some question to begin with, whether an interpretive
theory put forth only by agency counsel in litigation, which explains agency action that
could be explained on different theories, constitutes an 'an agency position' for purposes
of Chevron"); William Bros., Inc. v. Pate, 833 F.2d 261, 265 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e do
not agree that the Director's mere litigating position is due to be given deference.
Common sense tells us that if deference were always to be given to the Director's litigating
position, then the claimant would be effectively denied the right to appellate review....
If the Secretary has a position he wishes to express, he can do it through the proper
forum, i.e., the implementation of new clarifying regulations"); Bregsal v. Brock, 844 F.2d
1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The Department did not construe § 1802(3) in its amended
form until the onset of this litigation. The Secretary's construction is entitled to no more
deference than is the interpretation of any party to the suit"). See also Huffman v. Western
Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 673 n.9 (1988); Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Bd. of Governors,
Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1984); Todd v. Norman, 840 F.2d 608, 614 (8th
Cir. 1988) (Lay, J., dissenting); Brock ex rel. Williams v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F2.d 1134,
1146 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Church of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 165-66 (Silberman,
J., concurring).
291. See, e.g., Duggan v. Board of Educ. of East Chicago Heights, 818 F.2d 1291,
1296 (7th Cir. 1987); FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985);
Techworld Dev. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F.2d 106, 121 (D.D.C. 1986); Todd v.
Norman, 840 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1988); Ciba-Geigy v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 437 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); D & W Food Centers v. Block, 786 F.2d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1986); Wayside
Farms v. Department of HHS, 663 F. Supp. 945, 951-52 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 165-66 (D.C. 1986) (concurring opinion); but see
Getty v. FSLIC, 805 F.2d 1050, 106 at nn. 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
292. E.g., Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1988); FEC v.
Sailors' Union of the Pacific Political Fund, 828 F.2d 502, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1987); Rybicki
v. Hartley, 792 F.2d 260, 262 (1st Cir. 1986). Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 109
S.Ct. 468, 473 (1988) ("We have never appled the principle of [Chevron] to agency litigating
positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice").
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G. Miscellaneous Formats
A variety of other forms of interpretive expression can be found
in the case reports. Some can fairly be seen as having issued
pursuant to an implied delegatory intent that they bind the courts.
Thus, the Supreme Court cited Chevron and accepted as dispositive
an FDA statement, published with new regulations in the Federal
Register, that it did not intend to pre-empt state regulation of the
subject matter.98 Where the Farm Credit Administration had
statutory power to approve and adopt bylaws for its regional
production credit associations, FCA action to vest in its intermediate
credit banks the power of removal under the bylaws was held a
"reasonable policy decision" under Chevron.' The District of
Columbia Circuit held ripe and reviewable (in the face of Heckler v.
Chaney)"5 an interpretation pronounced in the Statement of Reasons
for a decision not to take enforcement action, and remanded to the
district court for review of the interpretation's reasonableness under
Chevron.29
6
Other formats treated with Chevron Step 2 respect cannot so
readily be viewed as resting upon an implied delegated power to
bind. An Antitrust Division affidavit was the object of Chevron
acceptance in Mattox v. FTC,21 although the court also relied upon
an identical interpretation in a decision of the FTC. Another case
referred to regulations that had been published in proposed form
but not yet adopted; the Second Circuit "deferr[ed]" to the notice of
proposed rulemaking, which it chose to treat as clarification of a
prior policy.'" A close case is Chapman v. Department of HHS,' where
the regulations did not cover the specific point but explanatory
material published with the final regulations did. The court accepted
the explanatory interpretation.' ° The matter at issue concerned the
authorized amount of civil penalties; when construing a penalty
statute, it is arguably inappropriate to rely upon the explanatory
293. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories. Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 714-15 (1985).
294. Bailey v. Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank, 788 F.2d 498, 504 (8th Cir. 1986).
The intermediate bank had statutory powers of supervision over the production credit
association. Id. at 502.
295. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
296. International Union, UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
297. 752 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1986).
298. Liegl v. Webb, 802 F.2d 623, 627 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting interpretation set
forth in a manual).
299. 821 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1987).
300. Id. at 527.
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gloss where the regulation itself is not dearly dispositive. A more
precise approach in all three of these cases would have been to treat
the agency interpretation as information entitled to special considera-
tion as the court deliberates its own best estimate of the statute's
meaning.
With these, as with all formats, the inquiry at the threshold of
Chevron Step 2 should be whether Congress has expressly or
impliedly delegated the authority to issue interpretations having the
force of law in the format used by the agency. If it has, the court
should proceed with the reasonableness inquiry of Step 2. If
Congress has not so delegated, the court generally should undertake
an independent interpretation of the statute, granting the agency's
views the special consideration called for by Skidmore. For informal
formats not carrying force of law, Chevron Step 2 should not be used
at all. 301
301. An exception, for pre-enforcement review, is sketched in text at supra notes 182-

